--- On Sat, 29/5/10, Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> wrote: > --- Grice coined "Modified Occam Razor": "Senses should not > be multiplied > beyond necessity". Surely McEvoy's is an unnecessary > multiplication of the > sense of 'know', What is necessary here need not be one sense only, any more than what is necessary for certain explanations need not be one kind of entity [say, physical]: and it question-begging to assume that knowledge in the conjectural, fallible sense is the "unnecessary multiplication" rather than knowledge in the sense of JTB. But even if we were to accept a stipulation that "know" only be used in the JTB sense (perhaps just to keep Grice's heart monitor from going beserk), and therefore accept that we may never claim to "know" something that turns out to be mistaken, we would not have advanced anything in terms of the substantive metaphysical debate. In fact, if we assume all knowledge has a conjectural character, all our stipulation means is that we can never "know" 'knowledge' - or, if we assume all "knowledge" is perforce _true_, then the false aspects of Newton's theories, say, were never any contribution to human knowledge. Neither conclusion seems particularly helpful or insightful. And it would remain open to the fallibilist, having abandoned use of the term "know" or "knowledge" in its JTB sense, to simply deploy another verb. Put another way: verbal stipulations can only give the illusion of solving substantive problems - in the same way not talking about bed bugs can only give the illusion of having got rid of them. Only philosophers, having been inculcated in the 'linguistic turn', could assert otherwise. Donal ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html