JLS' post still doesn't put any edible flesh on the bare bones of the assertion that Darwin's theory is somehow "inductive". The idea that distinguishing what D inferred or implied helps us here is wrong, it just leads us all up a linguistic cul-de-sac. 'Induction' is a supposed process of reasoning etc. The question is whether Darwin's theory depends on such a process - either in its context of discovery or its context of justification - that is, in how it was arrived at or in how it is shown to be true. Nothing in JLS' post even begins to explain how D's theory depends on such a process - in either of the ways mentioned, or in any other way at all. Instead JLS rests his case on something so flimsy - a kind of appeal to self-evidence and his own ability to discern the manifest truth as to how propositions are "reached" - it would be whimsical in a fairy-tale account of the history of science as written by a philosopher whose understanding of science is merely that of an analyst of language who has never fully confronted his own philosophical make-believe that there is such a thing as a process of 'induction' and that we need 'induction' to explain science and how science works:- ________________________________ >I was suggesting that, as a Griceian, you give me an instance of "p" (for any proposition "p") and I can tell you, by mere inspection of "p", whether "p" was reached inductively, deductively, abductively, or what not. And I was suggesting that, since OBVIOUSLY Darwin's "p" is of the type it is, Darwin MUST have arrived at it "inductively". > Or not, of course,> Of course not. Donal London