Reply to Robert Paul (15, Jun 2004) Robert's reply - now, alas, lost in my computer files but still available in hardcopy form - suggests, as I understand it, that our epistemically virtuous pursuit of justification, knowledge and truth needs to be tempered by a recognition of the essential role of trust (along with such things as loyalty and acceptance) within our interpersonal relations with others - i.e., being assured of our children's love for us - lest we fall prey to "the neurosis of epistemology." Such a recognition seems to be of a moral nature; it is a moral virtue of character to know "where and when we ought to make use of our epistemic virtues ..." (I'm happy with Phil's use of "phronesis" to name this virtue so long as we understand this kind of judgment in Kantian rather than Aristotelian terms.) But it seems to me that this virtue of judgment or character still presupposes a bifurcation between moral and epistemic virtue and the respective criteria they operate with. A person possessing this virtue understands in what circumstances trust trumps finding out or believing on good grounds as Robert put it. She recognizes, as such, that epistemically virtuous believing and acting may not be morally right or permissible; and conversely, that morally permissible action and judgment may yet be blameworthy on epistemic grounds. The common root I'm wondering about concerns the possibility of a virtue, norm or criterion which is simultaneously epistemic AND moral, both epistemically virtuous and morally virtuous as a holistic unity that is prior to its splitting off into separate realms of normative assessment. Walter Memorial U ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html