Most of us don't have a problem with whales being mammals, but there may be some more disturbing truths that in a way we know, yet we cannot quite accept. (Sorry if I sent this twice, the first time I died before I could finish the sentence.) O.K. On Wednesday, December 18, 2013 8:26 PM, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote: I would have thought that any cogent / justifiable attribution of "knowing-that" would logically or conceptually (I'm not finicky here) involve an attribution of "believing-that." As in: "Suma knows that whales are mammals" logically presupposes that "Suma believes that whales are mammals." To claim "I know that P" while denying "I believe that P" is a speech act the udderrance of which requires at least 5 Hail Marys. (Yes, it's bovine all the way down.) But that's only if you ask me. "What is edible or not is a matter of falsifiability." So true. Even dating back to the time of Lucy, it was always a matter of "Let Mikie try it." Walter O Quoting Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx: > In a message dated 12/17/2013 5:07:12 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, > donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: > "Who suggested trees are capable of "propositional knowledge"? Popper's > suggestion is that trees and animals have knowledge, not that trees have > propositional knowledge. A tree's knowledge is, in Popper's account, a World > 1 > kind of dispositional knowledge, as it lacks any World 2. Some animals may > have World 2 mental states, unconscious and conscious, and knowledge bound > up with such World 2 states - a World 2 kind of knowledge. In Popper's > account only human's have World 3 knowledge. And only World 3 knowledge > probably counts as what Walter terms "propositional knowledge", though World > 3 > knowledge is wider than "propositional knowledge". Trees have no access to > World 3, nor do animals. But while they may lack that kind of distinctively > > human knowledge bound up with World 3 that does mean they lack any knowledge > > whatsoever." > > Well put. > > I.e. although what a plant may be said to 'know' MAY be formulated > propositionally -- cfr. the complications of photosynthesis: > > 2n CO2 + 2n DH2 + photons → 2(CH2O)n + 2n DO -- > > this does not mean that a plant _believes_ -- never mind knows. > > For the record, "vegetable" comes from the Latin vegetabilis, which, as > used by Virgil, merely meant, "animated". Similarly, Catullus uses "vegetare" > > to mean "enliven" -- so either the old Romans were confused or _we_ are. > > In Varro, De Lingua Latina, the word is derived from "vegetus", which he > uses to translate Aristotle's "active" -- as in 'active intellect', but now > with reference to the process of growing, as in a plant. > > The word "vegetable" was first recorded in English much later, since > Anglo-Saxon had many specific words but seemed to have lacked the general > concept. "Vegetable" is first used only in the 15th century. It originally, > as in > Aristotle, applied to ANY plant. > > This is still the use of the ADJECTIVE "vegetable" in biological context > -- and in the phrase, "vegetable philosophy". > > In 1767, however, the meaning (or use) of the term "vegetable" was > specified, for some reason, to mean "plant cultivated for food, edible herb > or > root". It is now believed that a greengrocer first produced this change of > 'use' or meaning -- or 'implicature' if you must. > > On the other hand, the year 1955 noted the first use of the shortened, > slang term "veggie". "Vegan", oddly, is earlier, as coined by Donald Watson > in > 1944 when he co-founded the London-based British Vegan Society ('vegan' > initially meant "non-dairy vegetarian", but it later borrowed further > implicatures). > > As an adjective, the word "vegetable" is used in scientific and > philosophical contexts (as in Popperian epistemology) with a different and > much > broader meaning, namely of "related to plants" in general, edible or not. As > > Popper reminds us, 'what is edible or not is a matter of falsibiability' -- > > cfr. vegetable matter, vegetable kingdom, and vegetable origin. > > The meaning of "vegetable" as "plant grown for food" was not established > until the 18th century, again by greengrocers. > > Unlike Popper, but with Nicolai Hartmann, Grice generalises on this -- > Read his section on 'cabbages' and his criticism of Philippa Foot's idea of > > the 'natural': > > It may seems that the distance placed between the ontological strata of a > vegetable as a cabbage and an animal as a rabbit breaks up too much the > continuity of phenomena. > > However, there is a close continuity of structural tiers within each > stratum. > > Indeed, is difficult to see why the ascending series should be interrupted > at the strata boundaries. > > Our human inability -- in some of us -- to point out transitional > structures is of little account. > > Also, in our knowledge of the chain of structures JUST WITHIN and BETWEEN > the vegetable and animal kingdoms numerous connecting links seem to be > missing (a rabbit does not evolve from a cabbage). > > But that these gaps are apparent do not invalidate the idea of a genetic > sequence which here inevitably obtrudes itself. > > Or not, of course. For this (Popperian) objection would be justified ONLY > if the strata distances involved a disruption of the sequence of forms -- > with a 'cabbage' belonging to World 1, in his parlance, and a rabbit to > World 2 -- again in his parlance. > > But something quite different is meant, and this is the sudden emergence of > new categorial groups (e.g. rabbits) at certain levels -- and not just > from a magician's hat. > > Distance is not to be understood as a gap, but qualitatively as the > otherness of structure from a certain level upwards. Again, or not, of > course. > > Speranza > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html > ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html