[lit-ideas] Re: Vegetable Philosophy

  • From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2013 12:59:07 -0800 (PST)

Most of us don't have a problem with whales being mammals, but there may be 
some more disturbing truths that in a way we know, yet we cannot quite accept. 
(Sorry if I sent this twice, the first time I died before I could finish the 
sentence.)    O.K.



On Wednesday, December 18, 2013 8:26 PM, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx> 
wrote:
 
I would have thought that any cogent / justifiable attribution of "knowing-that"
would logically or conceptually (I'm not finicky here) involve an attribution of
"believing-that." 

As in: "Suma knows that whales are mammals" logically presupposes that "Suma
believes that whales are mammals." To claim "I know that P" while denying "I
believe that P" is a speech act the udderrance of which requires at least 5
Hail Marys. (Yes, it's bovine all the way down.) But that's only if you ask
me.

"What is edible or not is a matter of falsifiability."  So true. Even dating
back to the time of Lucy, it was always a matter of "Let Mikie try it."

Walter O


Quoting Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx:

> In a message dated 12/17/2013 5:07:12 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,  
> donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
> "Who suggested trees are capable of  "propositional knowledge"? Popper's 
> suggestion is that trees and animals have  knowledge, not that trees have 
> propositional knowledge. A tree's knowledge is,  in Popper's account, a World
> 1 
> kind of dispositional knowledge, as it lacks any  World 2. Some animals may 
> have World 2 mental states, unconscious and conscious,  and knowledge bound 
> up with such
 World 2 states - a World 2 kind of knowledge.  In Popper's 
> account only human's have World 3 knowledge. And only World 3  knowledge 
> probably counts as what Walter terms "propositional knowledge", though  World
> 3 
> knowledge is wider than "propositional knowledge". Trees have no access  to 
> World 3, nor do animals. But while they may lack that kind of distinctively 
> 
> human knowledge bound up with World 3 that does mean they lack any knowledge 
> 
> whatsoever."
>  
> Well put.
> 
> I.e. although what a plant may be said to 'know' MAY be formulated  
> propositionally -- cfr. the complications of photosynthesis:
>  
> 2n CO2 + 2n DH2 + photons → 2(CH2O)n + 2n DO --
>  
> this does not mean that a plant _believes_ -- never mind knows.
>  
> For the record, "vegetable" comes from the Latin vegetabilis, which, as  
> used by Virgil, merely meant, "animated". Similarly, Catullus uses "vegetare"
> 
> to  mean "enliven" -- so either the old Romans were confused or _we_ are.
>  
> In Varro, De Lingua Latina, the word is derived from "vegetus", which he  
> uses to translate Aristotle's "active" -- as in 'active intellect', but now 
> with  reference to the process of growing, as in a plant. 
>  
> The word "vegetable" was first recorded in English much later,
 since  
> Anglo-Saxon had many specific words but seemed to have lacked the general  
> concept. "Vegetable" is first used only in the 15th century. It originally, 
> as in 
> Aristotle, applied to ANY plant. 
>  
> This is still the use of the ADJECTIVE "vegetable" in biological  context 
> -- and in the phrase, "vegetable philosophy".
>  
> In 1767, however, the meaning (or use) of the term "vegetable" was  
> specified, for some reason, to mean "plant cultivated for food, edible herb 
> or 
> root". It is now believed that a greengrocer first produced this change of  
> 'use' or meaning -- or 'implicature' if you must.
>  
> On the
 other hand, the year 1955 noted the first use of the shortened,  
> slang term "veggie". "Vegan", oddly, is earlier, as coined by Donald Watson 
> in 
> 1944 when he co-founded the London-based British Vegan Society ('vegan'  
> initially meant "non-dairy vegetarian", but it later borrowed further  
> implicatures). 
>  
> As an adjective, the word "vegetable" is used in scientific  and 
> philosophical contexts (as in Popperian epistemology) with a different  and
> much 
> broader meaning, namely of "related to plants" in general, edible or  not. As
> 
> Popper reminds us, 'what is edible or not is a matter of falsibiability'  --
> 
> cfr. 
 vegetable matter, vegetable kingdom, and vegetable origin. 
>  
> The meaning of "vegetable" as "plant grown for food" was not established  
> until the 18th century, again by greengrocers.
>  
> Unlike Popper, but with Nicolai Hartmann, Grice generalises on this  -- 
> Read his section on 'cabbages' and his criticism of Philippa Foot's  idea of
> 
> the 'natural':
>  
> It may seems that the distance placed between the ontological strata  of a 
> vegetable as a cabbage and an animal as a rabbit breaks up too much the  
> continuity of phenomena. 
>  
> However, there is a close continuity of structural tiers within each  
>
 stratum.
>  
> Indeed, is difficult to see why the ascending series should be  interrupted 
> at the strata boundaries. 
>  
> Our human inability -- in some of us -- to point out transitional  
> structures is of little account. 
>  
> Also, in our knowledge of the chain of structures JUST WITHIN and BETWEEN  
> the vegetable and animal kingdoms numerous connecting links seem to be 
> missing  (a rabbit does not evolve from a cabbage).
>  
> But that these gaps are apparent do not invalidate the idea of a  genetic 
> sequence which here inevitably obtrudes itself. 
>  
> Or not, of course. For this (Popperian) objection
 would be justified  ONLY 
> if the strata distances involved a disruption of the sequence of forms --  
> with a 'cabbage' belonging to World 1, in his parlance, and a rabbit  to 
> World 2 -- again in his parlance. 
>  
> But something quite different is meant, and this is the sudden emergence of 
>  new categorial groups (e.g. rabbits) at certain levels -- and not just  
> from a magician's hat.
>  
> Distance is not to be understood as a gap, but qualitatively as the  
> otherness of structure from a certain level upwards. Again, or not, of 
> course.
>  
> Speranza
>  
>  
>  
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