[lit-ideas] Re: Truly, Madly, Deeply

  • From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2013 19:40:25 +0000 (GMT)



From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx

>I think  Hart, borrowing from Bentham, would distinguish between internal 
and external  readings, and this is something Grice also essays in his 
"Aspects of  Reason".

That may be so: but similar problems arise whatever the terminology.

"Jack believes that p.
Jack truly believes that  pl
Truly, Jack believes that p."

A better analogy might be drawn from the issue of attempting the impossible (on 
which Hart wrote).

Consider:

Jack believes x [that the powder in his case is cocaine]
That 'x' is 'y'
So Jack believes 'y' [that the powder in his case is baking soda].

This applies in the law of attempts:
Jack intends to bring x [cocaine in a suitcase] into the country
That 'x' is, in fact, 'y'
So Jack intends to bring 'y' into the country.

The issue in the Pryce case is to what extent can her belief be deemed 
'genuine' when it is merely subjective such that - given her capability to see 
that objectively that she could act otherwise than she did - it cannot be 
considered a genuine belief (but merely a self-serving belief).

As indicated, this conundrum is left for the jury to resolve.

Donal

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