The "by definition" here is intriguing. If we mean that when a person makes a choice she is the source or author of the choice, then, yes, I can see that it is "personal." I can also understand choices as being personal in matters to do with anchovies and highly peaty whiskeys. That I prefer my pizzas anchovies-less but succulently overflowing with gooey mozarella cheese, and my malts estery and butterscotchy with an after-taste of dark chocolate, is a matter of personal taste/preference. In making such choices at the pizzeria or liquour store, I am not prescribing such preferences to others on some set of putatively general criteria of normative assessment. But we of course also choose in social, moral and political contexts. Such choice requires deliberation and, if necesary, redemption/justification. The justification I give for a choice of policy or course of action, while "personal" in the sense of its origins, is not "personal" when it comes to its justification. In such contexts, if I choose policy Y over policy X, the cogency and rationality of my choice requires that I publicly offer this choice as a universally valid one to all persons in relevantly similar circumstances. Ca voulait dire, the rationality of my "personal" choice is determined by whether the policy or action I choose is ...... wait for it .... unversalizable. So not all choices are personal in epistemic terms. The "by definition" is false, I believe, for in justifying certain choices, none of us can be on our own (i.e., "monologically")both judge and jury. And, of course, no rational creature chooses a course of action she knows (i.e., herself believes) to be wrong or unjustifiable. Clearly still snowed under, and prognosticating ... prosylatizing ... prevaricating ... prolegomenizing ... promiscuing ... prostating ... *procrastinating*, thank you! Walter O. Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>: > I am not sure on the distinction between choice and personal choice; it would > seem that choices are almost by definition personal. When I wrote the below, > I was thinking of some of the more corrupt legal systems (such as the one I > am currently living in) where it often seems like a legal ruling *becomes* a > matter of personal choice. (A court may choose to convict or not seemingly > with little reference to the facts of the case) Surely, this is not the state > of affairs that should be aspired to. > > > O.K. > > > > ________________________________ > From: Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx> > To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx; Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> > Sent: Friday, February 22, 2013 1:22 PM > Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Truly > > I'd say "choice" is inappropriate in this context, but not because it is > equivalent to "personal choice" (which it isn't) but rather because > convicting > or not is a matter of "decision." Both competencies require deliberation as > the > process through which the respective products are *made* (interesting > metaphor). > But decision-making would seem to be more tightly constrained and governed by > extant criteria, norms and principles than acts of choice. Choice is more > open-ended as to its bases/grounds and options available. I think this holds > also in French, German and Russian. (Don't know about Latin or Greek, but > methinks we may soon be enlightened.) > > An interesting educational question here is how we should go about teaching > for > these competencies. If there is a difference in meaning, does that not signal > a > need for different pedagogies and modes of learning? > > Of course, there are situations in which the difference is moot: i.e., > whether > one *decides* on the firing squad rather than the guillotine, or *chooses* > one > over the other, the end result is the same for most intents and porpoises. > > Choosing to read Habermas and reconstructing human communicative competence > while mercilessly snowed-in on the Avalon, > > Walter O. > > > > > Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>: > > > Well, I don't think that convicting or not convicting is supposed to be a > > matter of 'choice'. Aren't judges and juries supposed to be compelled by > the > > facts, or lack of them ? If it ever comes down to a matter of personal > choice > > then there is probably something fishy going on. > > > > > > O.K. > > > > > > > > ________________________________ > > From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> > > To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > > Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2013 7:50 PM > > Subject: [lit-ideas] Truly > > > > McEvoy, in "Jurisprudence" refers to > > > > ""she truly believed she had no real choice" to convict - because, while > > she subjectively believed or felt she had no real choice, objectively she > had > > > > a choice and so her belief was not a "truly believed"; and on another > > reading to acquit - because, while objectively she had a choice, > > nevertheless > > she subjectively "truly believed" she had no choice. [Those familiar with > > Kant's first Critique will know the trouble he had resolving the > subjective > > and objective aspects of things, and the voluminous literature that has > > ensued, and so might understand why a judge might stay clear of trying to > > sort > > this out for the jury." > > > > Indeed, the adverb 'truly' can be a trick. > > > > I think Hart, borrowing from Bentham, would distinguish between internal > > and external readings, and this is something Grice also essays in his > > "Aspects of Reason". > > > > "Truly", on the other hand, can be what was called in Oxford, with artless > > > sexism, a trouser-word. > > > > She truly believed she had no real choice. > > > > ANOTHER SCENARIO: > > > > Jack: did he believe it? > > Jill: He believes that p. > > > > Jack believes that p. > > Jack truly believes that pl > > Truly, Jack believes that p. > > > > It seems that 'truly', as Ramsey said about 'true', is redundant (Grice > > refers to Ramsey's 'redundance' theory of truth). > > > > Try 'sincerely'. > > > > Etc. > > > > Cheers, > > > > Speranza > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html > > > This electronic communication is governed by the terms and conditions at > http://www.mun.ca/cc/policies/electronic_communications_disclaimer_2012.php > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html This electronic communication is governed by the terms and conditions at http://www.mun.ca/cc/policies/electronic_communications_disclaimer_2012.php ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html