[lit-ideas] Re: Tittles--a change of title

  • From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sat, 14 Jun 2008 14:37:53 -0230

Just a few remarks here and there ---------------->

Quoting Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>:

> Walter O. wrote:
> "It should be noted that both the early and the later W were
> transcendental philosophers. Staying with the later W, his fundamental
> and abiding transcendental claim is that meaning and understanding are
> conditioned for their possibility by language-games."

> It seems to me that if W. is a transcendental philosopher, he is an
> odd kind.  True, there is a great deal of stage-setting that goes into
> making meaning and understanding possible, but what is involved in
> stage-setting are customs and habits.  That is, we know what words and
> sentences mean when we learn how to use them in a particular language.
>  However, we learn a particular language by learning how to use
> particular words and sentences in particular cases.  Languages then
> are as uniform, consistent, or rational as our habits and customs.

-------------> Clearly, since a language is itself constituted by habits and
customs (and conversely). Cultural customs do not, and cannot, exist
independent of their modes of linguistic institutionalization. For example, the
meaning of the linguistic utterance/speech act "You're out!", asserted during a
baseball game by a particular person at a particular time remains
unintelligible outside the cultural practices of the game. But the latter would
not be possible without a language codifying its semantics and syntax. This
remains a transcendental "truth," and W was well aware of its status.

To be continued in next posting. Cheers, Walter

> §18. Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little
> streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with
> additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of
> new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses. (PI)
> If that is an accurate description of languages, then I am not sure
> how language-games function as limits.  For example, take the matter
> of playing games.  In what sense does the place of the word 'game' in
> the English language delineate the meaning and understanding of games?
>  There are board games, card games, team games, solitary games, games
> with winners and losers, and games with none.  I am not sure how to
> make sense of language-games delineating the limits of meaning and
> understanding if I can't explain what is meant by the word 'game'
> without making reference to the various activities that count as
> games.  There is certainly a transcendental quality to Wittgenstein's
> thought, but I just don't see him doing transcendental philosophy.
> Walter continues:
> "The 'last W', the W of *On Certainty*, remains true to the
> transcendental quest: What are the possibilities and limits of genuine
> 'propositions'?"
> And then one finds comments like:
> §98. The same proposition may get treated at one time as something to
> test by experience, at another as a rule of testing. (OC)
> or
> §134. One feature of our concept of a proposition is, sounding like a
> proposition. (PI)
> I may be wrong, but that doesn't strike me as being part of a
> transcendental quest.
> Sincerely,
> Phil Enns
> Yogyakarta, Indonesia
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
> digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html

To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html

Other related posts: