[lit-ideas] Re: There is no such thing as _a_ logico-philosophicus
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 23 Feb 2013 13:36:44 +0000 (GMT)
________________________________
From: Richard Henninge <RichardHenninge@xxxxxxxxxxx>
On the subject of arrant nonsense:
>Because "logico-philosophicus" is an adjective. This is
something that can be learned. And when a judge repeats what to you may seem to
lack explanatory power, it may be because you, like others on a jury, don't
quite grasp how adjectives and adverbs and nouns work in the language. "An
<adjective> <noun> is a <noun> that is <adjective>." "A
big tree is a tree that is big." "A reasonable doubt is a doubt that is
reasonable." A logical-philosophical treatise is a treatise that is
logical-philosophical, not a treatise on "philosophical logic," as Donal
erroneously thinks">
That "logico-philosophicus" is taken in its adjectival meaning does not answer
the question 'What does that adjective describe and how does what it describes
differ to what is described by "philosophical logic", albeit that is a noun':-
we can of course ask how what is described by an adjective differs from what is
described by a noun in a sense where the answer has nothing to do with the
difference between adjectives and nouns [which difference Richard, quite
arrogantlyand contra Wittgenstein I suggest, supposes is beyond the grasp of
"others on a jury" - as if the grasp of ordinary meanings is beyond the
comprehension of those ordinary users of languages (it is implicit in my posts
that the jury's questions are perhaps not that foolish btw [the ex-DPP here has
said the same] and that the case is intellectually more tricky than it might
seem)].
We might ask what is the difference between physics and mathematics, for
example, using the noun formthroughout: or we might ask substantively the same
question by asking 'What is the difference between physics and a mathematical
theory (or theorem)?'. Here 'mathematical' is an adjective and 'physics' a
noun: but only afool, or Richard, would answer the question 'What is the
difference between physics and a mathematical theory (or theorem)?' by saying
'Well, 'physics' is a noun and 'mathematical' an adjective.' Yet some people go
to university only to learn this kind of answer is some kind of wisdom - which
they think cannot be grasped by the likes of me or "others on a jury". Pity the
fool, as Mr. T says.
That Richard thinks we can answer the substantive question by pointing out the
difference between adjectives and nouns shows it is he, not the jury, who lacks
a grasp of how adjectives and nouns "work in the language": for they do not
"work" so that the difference between them, qua adjective and qua noun,
furnishes us with any answer to the substantive question. (See above example:
'physics' and 'mathematical theory'; or consider 'chemical theory' and
'mathematics' - the possibilities are endless, believe me.)
Now let us settle down and askwhat is the "explanatory power" of a claim like
"A reasonable doubt is a doubt that is
reasonable." Richard suggests it only seems to lack explanatory power to people
like me and "others on a jury" who "don't
quite grasp how adjectives and adverbs and nouns work in the language". Is this
true?
The fact is that its lack of explanatory power is not because of any switch
from noun to adjectival meaning but because "A reasonable doubt is a doubt that
is
reasonable" amounts to a tautologyor a virtual tautology: and a tautology lacks
explanatory power - nothing to do with nouns and adjectives but becauseof logic.
We knowthat science has developed explanatory theories are to what is inside
the atom - how the atom is constituted. Very powerful explanatory theories.
They took some very fine minds to develop - perhaps a finer kind of mind than
needed to grasp the difference between an adjective and a noun. But if Richard
is rightthat "A reasonable doubt is a doubt that is
reasonable" has "explanatory power", one wonders why those scientists did not
contentthemselves with the following kind of "explanation":- "The atom is
constituted by what constitutes an atom, and what constitutes an atom is
constituted by the constituents of the atom, and the constituents of the atom
are determined by howan atom is constituted." If Richard thinks, as he
seemingly does, that this kind of thing has "explanatory power", he fails to
understand that a string - even a flawless string - of tautological claims
cannot amount to any kind of explanation.
Next Richard will tell us the explanation for why he is a "Richard" is that he
is a "Richard". I, for one, can think of abetter explanation.
Donal
Telling it like it is
London
("like the Tractatus, PI is a book on ‘philosophical
logic’"--from "Wittgenstein's Child I"). Before letting Donal go much
further in his frustrated attempt to get a hearing from the
"Wittgensteinians" on the list for his theory of the one true way to understand
Wittgenstein, I thought it necessary to point out some of what the German
speakers would call his "Wissenslücken" (gaps [or holes] in the knowledge
of something), here, of Wittgenstein, by quoting Wittgenstein's comment to
Ogden: "There is no such thing as philosophic logic"; hence, he would scarcely
have written, as Donal maintains, not just one, but two books on the subject.
Granted, Donal gives himself a lot of leeway when it comes to attributing
errors
to himself:But before we even _go there_, it might be useful for someone to
clarify the supposed distinction between "philosophic logic" and the
"logico-philosophicus" in the title of the _Tractatus_. Dusted down from its
latin tags, "logico-philosophicus" would not seem a million miles from [my
emphases--RH] "philosophic logic".
On the other hand, in ". . . she truly believed she had no real choice but to
do so"
the word "truly" is an adverb modifying the verb "believe" and therefore has
nothing to do, pace Donal, with the objective truth of what she believes, and
that is why the jury should only be
concerned with how truly she believed it, not how true that
which she believed actually was.
I say "pace Donal" because I know his overbearing will to be
right will probably come back to deny, rebut or otherwise sconce my
identification of this flaw in his thinking--". . . it might be possible on one
reading of "she truly
believed she had no real choice" to convict - because, while she subjectively
believed or felt she had no real choice, objectively she had a choice and so
her
belief was not a "truly believed"--and I
could probably hold my breath as long as it takes for him to do
so.
Richard Henninge
University of Mainz
Donal
Not
holding his breath for an explanation of the difference between 'philosophical
logic' and a 'logico-philosophicus'
London
*As
to claims like "A reasonable doubt is a doubt that is reasonable", when
considered for their lack of explanatory
power, Popper is inclined to blame the baneful influence of certain
analytic philosophers: see Realism and the Aim
of Science.
----- Original Message -----
>From: Donal McEvoy
>To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2013 2:27 PM
>Subject: [lit-ideas] Jurisprudence: ordinary language philosophy in action
>today?
>
>
>
>As Wittgenstein might now say - "Do you see? Do you see what is shown here?"
>
>
>
>But of course a better jurisprudence is a Popperian one which accounts for
>all this in terms of specific problems and their possible solutions.*
>
>
>
>
>
>Donal
>Not holding his breath for an explanation of the difference between
>'philosophical logic' and a 'logico-philosophicus'
>
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