Why? Because "logico-philosophicus" is an adjective. This is something that can be learned. And when a judge repeats what to you may seem to lack explanatory power, it may be because you, like others on a jury, don't quite grasp how adjectives and adverbs and nouns work in the language. "An <adjective> <noun> is a <noun> that is <adjective>." "A big tree is a tree that is big." "A reasonable doubt is a doubt that is reasonable." A logical-philosophical treatise is a treatise that is logical-philosophical, not a treatise on "philosophical logic," as Donal erroneously thinks ("like the Tractatus, PI is a book on ‘philosophical logic’"--from "Wittgenstein's Child I"). Before letting Donal go much further in his frustrated attempt to get a hearing from the "Wittgensteinians" on the list for his theory of the one true way to understand Wittgenstein, I thought it necessary to point out some of what the German speakers would call his "Wissenslücken" (gaps [or holes] in the knowledge of something), here, of Wittgenstein, by quoting Wittgenstein's comment to Ogden: "There is no such thing as philosophic logic"; hence, he would scarcely have written, as Donal maintains, not just one, but two books on the subject. Granted, Donal gives himself a lot of leeway when it comes to attributing errors to himself: But before we even _go there_, it might be useful for someone to clarify the supposed distinction between "philosophic logic" and the "logico-philosophicus" in the title of the _Tractatus_. Dusted down from its latin tags, "logico-philosophicus" would not seem a million miles from [my emphases--RH] "philosophic logic". On the other hand, in ". . . she truly believed she had no real choice but to do so" the word "truly" is an adverb modifying the verb "believe" and therefore has nothing to do, pace Donal, with the objective truth of what she believes, and that is why the jury should only be concerned with how truly she believed it, not how true that which she believed actually was. I say "pace Donal" because I know his overbearing will to be right will probably come back to deny, rebut or otherwise sconce my identification of this flaw in his thinking--". . . it might be possible on one reading of "she truly believed she had no real choice" to convict - because, while she subjectively believed or felt she had no real choice, objectively she had a choice and so her belief was not a "truly believed"--and I could probably hold my breath as long as it takes for him to do so. Richard Henninge University of Mainz Donal Not holding his breath for an explanation of the difference between 'philosophical logic' and a 'logico-philosophicus' London *As to claims like "A reasonable doubt is a doubt that is reasonable", when considered for their lack of explanatory power, Popper is inclined to blame the baneful influence of certain analytic philosophers: see Realism and the Aim of Science. ----- Original Message ----- From: Donal McEvoy To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2013 2:27 PM Subject: [lit-ideas] Jurisprudence: ordinary language philosophy in action today? As Wittgenstein might now say - "Do you see? Do you see what is shown here?" But of course a better jurisprudence is a Popperian one which accounts for all this in terms of specific problems and their possible solutions.* Donal Not holding his breath for an explanation of the difference between 'philosophical logic' and a 'logico-philosophicus'