[lit-ideas] Re: The universal applicability of moral judgments -- what is ethics about?

  • From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
  • To: wokshevs@xxxxxx
  • Date: Thu, 4 Dec 2008 17:55:10 -0330

I had one more remark ...

Eric D maintains, if I understand him correctly, that in order to understand the
meaning of a moral judgement one must understand how the words in that judgement
refer to real interactions. Since understanding a judgement is a necessary
condition of knowing that the judgement is true or right, it follows that an
intelligible reference to real interactions is necessarily a "first epistemic
step" in justifying and hence knowing a moral judgement. 

Regardless of the soundness of these claims, would we be wrong in interpreting
them as (fallible) transcendental claims regarding necessary conditions for the
possibility of justification in the moral domain? Or is the scope of
applicability of these claims restricted in some way by cultural or some other
empirical factors?

Walter O
MUN










Quoting wokshevs@xxxxxx:

> Once again Eric D serves up a veritable smorgasbord of fascinating questions
> and observations on moral reason. For now, just a few dips, tastes and
> nibbles
> on a couple of matters.
> 
> Neither I nor the Master would claim that moral judgements are
> "transcendental
> and necessary." (Btw, a transcendental condition is already both universal
> and
> necessary.)One form of analysis of our capacities for moral reason and
> judgement takes transcendental form. When Aristotle claims that we cannot
> deliberate about certain matters, when Kant claims that morality is
> derivative
> upon rational autonomy, when Habermas claims that any moral judgement makes
> a
> claim to universal validity and applicability, he/they are claiming that
> such
> competences or discourses are only possible under certain conditions that
> are
> necessary for their possibility. Limits of competences and discourses are
> also
> identified within transcendental (T) analysis. 
> 
> For example, the claim that "The marginalization and oppression of women is
> morally wrong" - a claim often made within arguments for multiculturalism as
> a
> political ideal and research agenda - can be the subject of a T analysis
> concluding that such a claim necessarily presupposes universal validity. If
> the
> T analysis is correct, and all T analyses are fallible of course, we can
> conclude that regardless of whether anybody actually makes or believes that
> moral claim, the claim itself is conditioned for its possibility
> (intelligibility and justifiability) by the presupposition of universality.
> Similarly, Kant nowhere claims that we can know whether an action has been
> performed from duty, and hence possesses intrinsic moral worth. Nor can we
> know
> whether humans actually possess the freedom that is a necessary condition
> for
> the possibility of moral judgement and action. Both are necessary
> presuppositions of the very intelligibility and cogency of respectively,
> moral
> worth and moral judgement. (And there are no convincing reaosn to believe
> otherwise.)
> 
> The question of "whether one should abide by the results of T inquiry"
> confuses
> hypothetical imperatives - imperatives tied to instrumental or technical
> maxims
> - with the categorical imperatives characteristic of moral judgements. If a
> T
> analysis is cogent, then one cannot but presuppose the relevant conditions
> of
> possibility when engaged in the discourse or when expressing the identified
> competence. If I'm trying to convince you of the truth or rightness of a
> claim
> I make, I do not ask myself whether I should abstain from any form of
> seduction
> or deception in persuading you, however instrumentally effficacious such
> strategic action may be. If I am competent in the discourse of "convincing,"
> then I can only present you with reasons for the truth or rightness of my
> claim
> - reasons for you to assess as a rationally autonomous agent. If I believe
> otherwise, that very belief is sufficient to demonstrate the absence of
> competence.
> 
> Note that it is not a cogent objection to T analyses to say that that's not
> how
> Sarah Pailin goes about convincing people, or that in Pakistan, "morality"
> is
> theocentrically defined. Such empirical claims provide no cogent objection to
> T
> claims. Well, that's enough for now. Let's see what they're saying about
> Milton
> Berle today.
> 
> Walter O
> MUN
> 
> 
> Quoting Eric Dean <ecdean99@xxxxxxxxxxx>:
> 
> > 
> > Thanks to Walter for the continuing discussion and for the suggestion that
> we
> > take the questions about moral judgment one at a time.
> > 
> > Walter asserts that: "...moral justification must be applicable to real
> > interactions [though we should] recognize that 'real interactions' bears
> no
> > epistemic import in the case of moral judgment.  That is to say, what
> people
> > actually do is of no necessary relevance to what they ought to do."
> > 
> > I think the second sentence means that actual human behavior does not
> count
> > as evidence with respect to moral judgments, and I agree with that.  
> > 
> > The first sentence, though, is a little more problematic.  While real
> > interactions do not serve as evidence with respect to moral judgments, the
> > words used in moral judgments certainly refer to real interactions.  In
> that
> > sense, real interactions must have *some* sort of 'epistemic import' here
> --
> > i.e. if one did not understand how the words in a moral judgment referred
> to
> > real interactions one could not be said to understand the judgment, and I
> > take understanding to be the minimum first epistemic step -- you can't
> really
> > be said to know something if you don't understand it.
> > 
> > Walter goes on to say: "...'applicability to real interactions' should not
> > blind us from recognizing that part of the contemporary discipline of
> ethics
> > is of a transcendental nature concerned with identifying universal and
> > necessary features of moral judgment and the assessment of the objectivity
> > and impartiality of moral deliberation."
> > 
> > It may be that a number of people, calling themselves contemporary
> > philosophers concerned with ethics, may think of what they are doing as
> > exploring "universal and necessary features' and assessing 'objectivity
> and
> > impartiality', but just as actual behavior is not evidence with respect to
> > moral judgments, so the behavior of actual people is not evidence of the
> > intellectual merits of a position.  This just by way of blocking the
> argument
> > that there must be a transcendental and necessary aspect to moral
> judgments
> > otherwise so many people wouldn't be studying those aspects of moral
> > judgments.  I don't think Walter would make such a dubious move, but he
> seems
> > to be veering perilously close here.
> > 
> > Now to the substance: if moral judgments are 'transcendental and
> necessary'
> > and can be applied to real human interactions, then it would seem to me
> that
> > either (a) the real human interactions must somehow contain, manifest,
> > participate in or otherwise themselves have some relationship to the
> > transcendental and necessary properties of the judgment which relationship
> > has an important role in making the judgment applicable to the real
> > interactions or (b) the 'transcendental and necessary' aspects of moral
> > judgments are not relevant to their applicability to real interactions.
> > 
> > My questions to Walter are:
> > 
> > (1) Is there a third alternative I am leaving out of account?
> > (2) If not, then if (a) is correct, can you explain what that relationship
> > is, i.e. explain how it is that real human interactions exhibit the
> > transcendental and necessary properties of the relevant moral judgments?
> > (3) Alternatively, if (b) is correct, then can you give an example to
> > illustrate how a moral judgment can be transcendental and necessary and be
> > applicable to real interactions without the applicability depending on the
> > transcendental and necessary features of the judgment?
> > 
> > Finally, Walter also writes: "The concern here is with philosophical
> truth,
> > not with convincing people that they ought to abide by the results of
> > transcendental inquiry."
> > 
> > In general, I am in sympathy with this point.  I do, however, want to
> point
> > out that there is a difference between convincing *others* of something
> and
> > being convinced *oneself*.  It is precisely because I do not find the
> > transcendental inquiries about moral judgments convincing for myself that
> I
> > think they are misguided.  I then work to explain to my own satisfaction
> why
> > that lack of conviction is warranted and it is the results of those
> efforts
> > thus far that I am expressing here.
> > 
> > Moreover, I believe that to be convinced about those transcendental
> inquiries
> > simply is to be convinced that one should abide by the results.  In other
> > words, while again I agree that the work here is not to be judged by its
> > reception in the court of public opinion, I do think that the point to the
> > discussion is to explore whether one should abide by the results of
> > transcendental inquiry.
> > 
> > The challenge, it seems to me, is precisely that we are all, each of us,
> > individual people whose convictions may be swayed, one way or another, by
> > considerations not relevant to the merits of the transcendental inquiry. 
> We
> > are, in a way, most vulnerable to such suasion precisely when considering
> > these things by ourselves, because it is when alone that we are all most
> > vulnerable to the blandishments of our preferred illusions.  On the other
> > hand, when we are discussing these in a group we are vulnerable to the
> sorts
> > of forces that notoriously skew the judgments of the court of public
> > opinion.
> > 
> > The point is that while it's appropriate to deny jurisdiction here to the
> > court of public opinion, we should not think that we can thereby avoid
> some
> > of the pricklier questions about what it means to be persuaded.
> > 
> > Regards to one and all,
> > Eric Dean
> > Washington DC
> > 
> 
> 
> 



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