[lit-ideas] Re: The physicalist view of names
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 2 Sep 2013 14:24:04 +0100 (BST)
________________________________
From: Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>
>two notes
1. it is a poor equivalent to Searle's problem>
This "note" is a poor equivalent of one which explains to which of Searle's
problems it is "equivalent" [if 'Chinese box' then which version], how exactly
it is "equivalent" [rather than somewhat similar], and how it is "poor" by
comparison.
>2. it works reductively as well:, i.e. supopse the robot names in the
>rpescribed way, what is the requirement that the robot understands? is it the
>same requirement that the alleged fact that the human who "names" names
>'knowing that she names'?
The endless chos brougth about by those who think there is a conscious porcess…>
This spins off away from the crux of Popper's argument - perhaps indicating the
writer does not properly understand the argument and so is in no intellectual
position to judge it a poor equivalent of anything.
If the writer understood the argument he would understand that to meet it we
need to spell out how words correlate with the objects they name in terms of
theory that uses only the physics of words, the physics of objects and the
physics of the relations between such words and objects.
Has the writer such a theory (I'm all ears) or does he offer only the "endless
chaos" of spinning off the point?
>of, how much I miss Sigismund freud…>
So, I understand, does Sigmund.
D
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