O. K. writes: "[S]urely it is possible to argue that certain statements that purport to be metaphysical are actually nonsense without making the sweeping claim that they all are. Neither is it necessary to posit the criterion of empirical verifiability for statements to be meaningful as the positivists did. (It might be argued that statement has to be meaningful in at least some sense in order for us to be able to tell whether it expresses an empirically verifiable proposition.) Here are some of the possibilities: A statement in metaphysics [a metaphysical statement, proposition] may have at least three values: 1. It may be nonsense -- i.e. an undefined combination of words. (Of course this might be the value of a statement in any subject, not just philosophy.)" Well, this seems to be Carnap's and Ayer's view re: Heidegger i. The Nothing noths. or ii. The nothing noths. D. P. Henry notes that a mediaeval philosopher said something like, "By necessity, nothing must be nothing", which Henry claims is like the predecessor of Heidegger's claim. Henry does not find the verb 'noth' nonsensical at all. And his use of the "[[ ... ]]" is meant to provide a corresponding verb for any noun ('noth' for 'nothing'). We are familiar with that from Quine, "Pegasus pegasises". "2. It may be a disguised rule of grammar (PP p. 312) -- rather than the statement of fact ("real definition") its author the metaphysician intends it to be." Well, if Henry is right that there is some deductive system in which "The Nothing noths" becomes a logical truth, we may find this conclusion as being yielded by premises and axioms in the system which are the logical correlates of 'rules of grammar'. So "The nothing noths" fits here too. "3a. It may be a suggestive picture -- i.e. one that suggests images to us, but that takes us no further. The proposition 'It's 5 o'clock on the sun' illustrated by "a grandfather clock which points to 5" (PI§ 350), and maybe the "questions without answers", are examples of these. Many such pictures give a false account of the way we use some "sign" or other of our language -- i.e. they are a mistaken understanding of the sign's "grammar" (The distinction between a sign and its use in the language), e.g. the word 'mind' as the name of an invisible object." Well, this applies perfectly to "The Nothing noths". Henry spends some time discussing Lewis Carroll's "Nobody runs faster than me". "That's not true," said the King, "or he had come here earlier". "3b. Or it may be a way of looking at things -- i.e. speculation that is not subject to falsification by anomaly. (Note that some scientific theories are also ways of looking at things -- that is, ways of summarizing [organizing] a selected set of data [Every scientific theory is facts plus imagination] -- that are not falsifiable, e.g. the heliocentric and geocentric models of the solar system.) Of course it may also simply be an idle picture -- although note well that metaphysicians know that their pictures cannot be compared with "perceptible reality" -- i.e. that their metaphysical propositions are not empirical propositions -- and therefore it does not trouble them that their speculative propositions cannot be verified or tested by experience. For, metaphysics says, "Our experience is only experience of appearances, not of reality itself"; cf. Plato's cave image (Republic 515c). Which statement may be an example of senses (2) or (3a) of the word 'metaphysics'." Well, I do think Heidegger was illustrating 'annihilation' and nihilism, and came up with "The Nothing noths" as a good adage to abbreviate that way of looking at things. "Some religious pictures may resemble these "idle pictures", because they also are not hypotheses; however, pictures in religion are used very differently from the way metaphysicians use pictures, e.g. they are not speculative. 3c. Or it may be a picture that it is "logically impossible" for us to be taught how to apply: "How is this picture, e.g. Michelangelo's God creating Adam (LC, p. 63), to be compared with what it is said to be a picture of?" But there is no answer -- i.e. the word 'compare' is not defined in this particular case; indeed, the artist did not intend for a comparison to be made." Well, there are some paradoxes associated with "Nothing" that Henry considers: iii. Nothing taught me to fly. iv. No-thing taught me to fly. was a well-known sophisma. Henry notes that the best answer to the sophism is: "Well, then: show us how you fly". The references to 'signs' is apt in that 'nihil' was much discussed by mediaeval philosophers as a 'sign' of some second imposition, and not a real name. And so on. Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html