[lit-ideas] Re: The nothing noths
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 17 Feb 2015 14:14:09 +0000 (UTC)
>I.e. Barrett is suggesting that the implicatures of
ii. Das Nichts nichtet.
differ from those triggers by
i. The nothing noths.>
But how so? Even if H's language cleaves to different etymologies etc., how
much is really lost in translation between the German and the English here?
I am sceptical that even the resonances of the phrase are that different
between the languages, but even more sceptical that what might be called the
'propositional content' differs substantively.
What may lurk at the back of contrary claims (viz. that there is some
'essential' difference between the two expressions) is an essentialist theory
of meaning as dependent on the essential particularities of the language in
which meaning is expressed. But this may be just one of those many essentialist
myths that are a hangover from the Greeks and which continue to infect
'literary' education, the humanities and philosophy twisted by a linguistic
turn.
Consider: 'Das gras ist grune' and 'The grass is green' - is there an essential
difference in meaning in philosophic terms or in terms of 'propositional
content'? [Would a German-phrased law as expressed by a German-speaking judge
at the European Court lose something vital in translation so that it could not
be translated into English, and so no English lawyer could properly express
that law in English? Or vice-versa? And is the same is the case for the
language of 'science'?]. What takes H's language out of the wide range of
inter-translatability between languages?
Of course, it is possible that the Greeks were onto something essential about
the nature of humanity that we moderns have lost. But it is not likely. What is
much more likely is moderns dissatisfied with modernity might seek their escape
in the idea of an authentic ancient existence that has been lost to us but
which might be refound to our redemption.
DnlLdn
On Tuesday, 17 February 2015, 13:41, "dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx"
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Geary had written about "'Twas brillig...":
"Words certainly do not have to mean anything to me, just please me. ...
Here's a start: The slithy toves did gyre and gimble upon the wabe, all
mimsy were the borogroves and the mome raths outgrabe. What greater truth
could be said than that?"
McEvoy protested.
Geary inspired R. Paul in a further post where he develops the theme that
the only valid signature for an artist, is, say, not "Mondrian" (or
"Mondriaan") but simply "Artist" (or its equivalent in Dutch).
Geary went on to thank C. B., made a distinction between what I might call
'poetic language' and 'philosophical language' (such as that of Martin
Heidegger, the Meßkirch-born German philosopher):
Geary: "Had he [the Meßkirch-born German philosopher that Grice, also a
philosopher, referred to, once, as "the greatest living philosopher"] been a
wonderful ... artist whose works spoke to me, I would have no trouble
separating his art from his person. In one sense I insist on doing that.
Philosophy, though, seems to me to have a kind of "moral element" attached to
it
-- as if, in a way of speaking, it "preaches" about what it means to be a
human being and urges us to own up to that."
C. B. had uttered the adage, commenting on a passage that dwelt on the
Meßkirch-born German philosopher's infamous obscurity,
If you haven't read Heidegger in German, you haven't read Heidegger
_simpliciter". (adapted).
which may equivocate on 'read' (cognate with English 'riddle').
The text quoted by C. B. is by W. Barrett and it may be worth re-quoting it
in full.
It may connect with Popper, who was in Vienna at the time when Carnap was
laughing at the the Meßkirch-born German philosopher and making a career out
of that -- Ayer followed suit in Oxford just to provoke his tutor, Gilbert
Ryle, who had reviewed the Meßkirch-born German philosopher for "Mind".
Barrett seems to be working with an adage:
"Clarity is not enough" (Lewis)
and one of Grice's maxims,
"Avoid obscurity of expression" -- a maxim of "MANNER", a conversational
category that refers NOT to WHAT is said, but to HOW what is said has been
said. It can be exploited for the purpose of triggering a conversational
implicature (the only interest in Grice in postulating the maxims in the first
place).
Barrett writes as follows, and we should consider
"The nothing noths."
Or
"Das Nichts nichtet"
if you must(n't).
"Then again, there is the matter of Heidegger's famous 'obscurity', which
would seem to require that special comment be made upon him. A great deal
of this 'obscurity' is a matter of translation, and disappears when
Heidegger is read in German."
I.e. Barrett is suggesting that the implicatures of
ii. Das Nichts nichtet.
differ from those triggers by
i. The nothing noths.
Barrett goes on:
"To be sure, his German is at times a very highly individualized vehicle
of expression: Heidegger does coin his own terms when he has to, and usually
these are coinings that stick very close to the etymological roots of
German."
I suppose 'nichten' is a case in point. But cfr. 'noth', qua verb (and the
quote by P. L. Heath cited in this same thread).
Barrett:
"Heidegger thinks very much within the matrix of the German language, and
his expressions hugs the particularity of this language to its bosom. All
of this makes for difficulty in translation."
We should thus compare
iii. Carnap's laughter (-- or 'hilarity' as Heath prefers) as he (Carnap)
read the Meßkirch-born German philosopher in the vernacular he shared: i.e.
the German language).
and
iv. Ayer's laughter, who found "The nothing noths" -- a mere translation of
the 'joke' -- laughable enough. Vide Ayer, "The elimination of metaphysics
via the logical analysis of language".
Barrett goes on:
"If we compare Heidegger with two classical German philosophers, like Kant
or Hegel, his sentences are remarkably compact and incisive, his expression
notably terse."
Yet Grice loved Kant, and would say his favourite philosopher EVER was
Kantotle (vide Bennett, "In the tradition of Kantotle", Times Literary
Supplement).
Barrett:
"Very often, in reading Hegel, we get the feeling ... that the philosopher
is deliberately willing to be obscure."
Grice played with Kantotle and Ariskant. I once played with Plathegel.
Hegel can be brilliant, in both the vernacular and the rough translation. For
example, the keyword: CUNNING OF REASON I find unique and in great need in
any dictionary of philosophy worth its name. Kant could critique reason,
both theoretical and practical, but lacked the humour to coin 'cunning of
reason', that manifests in history, as Hegel does.
Barrett goes on:
"One never gets this impression from Heidegger: he is struggling to
communicate, and his command of his own means of communication is powerful and
impressive. The difficulty comes, rather, from the obscurity of the matter
with which Heidegger is grappling."
This is controversial from a Griceian point of view.
If "Avoid obscurity" pertains to STYLE, rather than content, Barrett is
wrong.
Take
i. The nothing noths.
Carnap and Ayer criticised this for breaching logical syntax. The obscurity
is a matter of style. Content -- can it BE obscure? There was this adage,
'obscurus per obscurius", and it may be argued that obscurity (the opposite
of clarity) may pertain to the realms of metaphysics -- when the
philosopher tries to swim in the depths, rather than stay in the 'shallow
berths' as
Grice prefers of ordinary language.
"Avoid obscurity" then, which pertains to the MODE or manner or style, and
keep in mind that, still, clarity is not enough, which is yet not a
propaganda for obscurity.
Barrett goes on:
"That there are obscure matters at all in our experience is a contention
that rubs against the prejudice of some positivistic philosophers that
whatever cannot be said clearly and distinctly cannot be said at all and the
effort to say it can only result in 'meaningless' verbalism."
In the obituary to P. F. Strawson, Grice went to the extreme, as quoted,
"If you cannot put it in symbols, it is not worth saying it at all".
Barrett goes on
"Every philosopher, in this view, ought to be able to express himself with
the simple-minded clarity of, say, Bertrand Russell"
a favourite philosopher with Grice who wrote, "Definite descriptions in
Russell and in the vernacular".
He is thinking of Russell as USING his own symbols (co-invented with
Whitehead, after Peano), like the iota operator for things like 'The king of
France is bald'.
In other words, there's Russell and there's Russell.
Russell in fact criticised Strawson for not taking symbolism seriously
("Mr. Strawson on referring", Mind).
Barrett goes on:
"and if the philosopher does not do this, it is a clear sign of
intellectual incompetence. All this, of course, is oversimplified
psychologizing. A
philosopher may be quite capable of mastering one or the other of the
clear and distinct dialects of philosophy and bouncing the ball of dialectic
deftly back and forth across the net; but he may be drawn by other subject
matters into following a quite different path in philosophy. From the point
of view of a philosopher like Heidegger there are parts of our experience
that ordinary language finds itself hard put to express, if it can express
these matters at all."
The keyword here is: "ORDINARY LANGUAGE", that Grice defended (in "The
learned versus the vulgar'). He found it idiotic that Eddington should think
that English -- or ordinary language -- is inapt to describe Eddington's
table, and that therefore, the ordinary language way to describe a table is
WRONG and that a scientist equivalent, learned, rather than vulgar, is RIGHT.
Mutatis mutandis, the Meßkirch-born German philosopher ""preach[ing]" about
what it means to be a human being and urges us to own up to that", to
quote genial Geary. Because, however obscure, one CAN or MAY get the point
behind (i), the implicature as it were. The nothing noths because
iv. Nothingness annihilates.
A preface to nihilism in one form or other. There is some preaching about
what it means to be a human being if the nothing noths. Why should we let
the nothing noth? Perhaps the nothing does not noth as much as the pretty
nihilistic Meßkirch-born German philosopher (and later Parisian Sartre)
thought it did.
Barrett: concludes the quoted passage: "[I]ndeed, this ordinary language
seems to have been formed out a kind of conspiracy to cover over or forget
these parts of experience altogether."
Well, as McCreery has reminded us, we think it was Rorty who pointed out
the similarity between the rather COMPLEX philosophy of language by the
Meßkirch-born German philosopher and John Dewey (Grice gave the Dewey
Lectures).
Heidegger has a place for 'ordinary language': one way of describing
things is through their ability to be 'to hand', and there's the 'one' as in
'one says', which incorporates an anonymity that seems to be characteristic of
those who stick with ordinary language expressions.
Carnap and Ayer would still stick with the fact that there is still no real
need to breach the rules of logical syntax. A poet (or artist) can do that
-- and seldom do. But a metaphysician shouldn't?
Apparently, it all started recently, as Palma informed us, when the chair
of the Heidegger Society resigned from his post. This was upon the
11-volume? publication of the Meßkirch-born German philosopher's works in
GERMAN. It
may be some time before they are available in the native language of Sir
Freddie Ayer, that is, some form of English or other. And it seems it's
other keywords than "NOTHING" and "NICHTEN" that are the controversial reason
why the chair resigned. Not pure abstract metaphysics, but those segments of
the Meßkirch-born German philosopher's extensive work on areas like
political philosophy and stuff.
Cheers,
Speranza
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