[lit-ideas] Re: The meaning of life and the Categorical Imperative
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 14 Dec 2008 12:21:22 -0800 (PST)
I believe that this is the essay (by Peter Strawson):
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwstrawson1.htm
O.K.
--- On Sun, 12/14/08, wokshevs@xxxxxx <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote:
> From: wokshevs@xxxxxx <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The meaning of life and the Categorical Imperative
> To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Richard Henninge" <RichardHenninge@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Date: Sunday, December 14, 2008, 7:32 PM
> Very brief replies here -------->
>
>
> Quoting Richard Henninge
> <RichardHenninge@xxxxxxxxxxx>:
>
> > In a post responding to Robert Paul's challenging
> of his analysis of
> >
> > > "survival of the fittest" as a maxim in
> Kant's sense
> >
> > Walter O provides their previous exchange on the
> subject, in the course of
> > which he writes the following:
> >
> > The imagined law would itself
> > >> be internally inconsistent if it said that
> all should do what some
> > >> should do; but of course it doesn't say
> that.
>
> --------> I didn't say that. I think RP did.
>
> >
> > And yet of course it does. What more is the
> Categorical Imperative, after
> > all, than saying that ALL (the entire category of
> agents) SHOULD (the
> > imperative), which in turn would have to subsume what
> "some should" do.
>
> -----------> The question is whether all
> "could" so act, not whether they
> "should so act." Moral judgement is made after
> the results of the CI test are
> in.
>
> >
> > Earlier in the post Walter, speaking apparently on
> behalf of Kant--
> >
> > Neither I nor Kant deny this. What
> > > we deny is that such facts about human beings
> have any final epistemic
> > > authority
> > > in the justification of moral judgement--
> >
> > and waving a red flag, for me at least, in the form of
> "a fine essay" by
> > Strawson
> >
> > on these
> > > empirical factors,
> >
> > whose title he forgets,
>
> -----------------> Apologies. The title is
> "Freedom and resentment." What
> objections would you have to this piece?
>
> > he lets drop his loaded, slippery-slope thesis:
> >
> > And such facts do not invalidate
> > > the claim that moral judgement is
> transcendentally conditioned for its
> > > possibility by the autonomy and dignity of the
> capacity for giving reasons
> > >
> >
> > which seems to come down too heavily on individual
> capacities for giving
> > whatever reasons one will for making moral judgments,
> and precisely too
> > lightly on the human reason's ability to compare
> facts to make such
> > judgments reasonable, and hence applicable
> categorically.
>
>
> --------------> For Kant, as an autonomous agent one
> does not give "whatever
> reasons one will" since the will is guided by
> practical reason. (At the
> transcendental level, the will is naught but pure practical
> reason.) I'm afraid
> the second half of your text above makes no sense to me.
> Could you articulate
> further the point you're trying to make?
>
> Walter O
> MUN
>
> >
> > Richard Henninge
> > University of Mainz
> >
> >
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