[lit-ideas] Re: The location of location
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2015 17:22:43 +0000 (UTC)
>Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more problematic that it might seem>
The problem I had in mind was not finding keys when you need them, but, for
example, the problem of explaining how/why W1 objects (that are extended in
Descartes' sense) are located within space/time (that is unextended in
Descartes' sense)? How can an extended object be located within a field that
lacks extension (bearing in mind it is simply a hypostasization to treat space
and time as if they are 'extended' by referring to them in measurable terms so
that it appears they have varieties of size; and even if it is true that they
may be measured in size, that does not make them extended in Descartes' sense)?
[Compare: how can an 'unextended' force like gravity affect an extended
physical object, even one the size of a sun?]
We might suggest the problem of explaining how extended W1 'objects' can exist
in unextended space/time is at least as problematic as the problem of
explaining how W2 or W3 'objects' stand in relation to space/time.
These kinds of question cannot properly be left only to philosophers,
particularly philosophers without sound understanding of science - they need to
be approached taking into close account what we may conjecture about these
things in the light of our best contemporary theories in physics.
Popper would stress that we lack anything like an ultimate explanation for
these things - for example, we lack anything like an ultimate explanation for
how or why W1 objects are located within space/time. It may be that
contemporary physics will be overthrown before we have a better approach to
such questions - e.g. that the relations between space/time and W1 objects will
be theorised to be quite different to how they might be taken to be in the
light of our present physics (itself a difficult and controversial question).
Popper would also argue that ultimate explanations shall never be achieved in
this area - though we may make better or worse guesses in the light of our
evolving scientific knowledge.
This may help indicate why facing the difficulties of locating W1 objects
within W1 is therefore a fair starting-point before facing the admitted
difficulties of locating W2 and W3 content in relation to space/time and in
relation to W1.
Certainly taking this as a starting-point may dampen the impulse to doubt the
existence of autonomous W2 and W3 content (and its downward affects on W1)
because of these 'location' difficulties - given that we do not similarly and
impulsively conclude that W1 objects and space/time do not exist simply because
there are difficulties in explaining how they relate to one another.
DnlLdn
On Friday, 30 January 2015, 13:37, Donal McEvoy
<donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then it
>exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious point.>
While trying to work out something more substantial on these issues of
'location', I note that, in Popper's conception, W3 is not "timeless" a la
Plato but has a history - and so W3 content would apparently exist in time.
Likewise the succession of thoughts in W2 would seem to imply that W2 content
also exists in time.
I should also add that Popper, unlike Kant, is a realist as to time and change
- and has indeed asserted that the reality of time and change are the crux of
realism.
But my own workings out began by reflecting on the location of W1 objects
within W1 - and particularly within space and time where these are conceived as
dimensions of W1. Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more problematic that it
might seem - and it seems to me these problems should be addressed first if we
are to keep in proper perspective the admitted problems of localising W2 and W3
content.
Dnl
On Thursday, 29 January 2015, 16:34, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
If something changes over time - as both mind and knowledge do - then it
exists in time. It shouldn't even be necessary to make such an obvious point.
Descartes' mind is obviously burdened with left-overs from Christian soul,
which is supposed to be eternal.
O.K.
On Thu, Jan 29, 2015 at 1:27 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for DMARC
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
In a message dated 1/26/2015 2:08:03 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
I agree it would appear contradictory to argue (1) pain belongs to W2 but
(2) that pain also is located within the W1 brain and (3) W2 is located in
a way distinct to anything located in W1 [i.e. W2 events, like conscious
pain, do not share the identical spatio-temporal location of any W1 events].
I also agree that there is a large and unresolved problem as to the
'location' of consciousness, and thus of W2. I would also agree there is a
large
and unresolved problem as to the 'location' of W3 or W3 contents. But these
admittedly large and unresolved problems are far from conclusive arguments
against the independence of W2 and of W3 from W1.
I don't intend to suggest a solution to these large problems but here
clarify that Popper's position is that W3 "exists but exists nowhere" and that
W2 is located not within W1 but somehow adjacent to the W1 brain.
It seems that we have no obvious model for locating anything in space and
time except in the way we seek to locate W1 objects within W1: and this
creates an admitted problem, for there is a lack of any clear model for how we
'locate' W2 or W3 in these terms.
Despite this, it seems overwhelmingly the case that consciousness exists;
and though it is less overwhelming, the strong case is that consciousness
is distinct from being a mere W1 process - for there is no analogue of
consciousness in any W1 processes as these are conceived by science.
So we quickly reach one of the immense and weird imponderables of the
mind-body problem, that have given rise to very different reactions - including
that radical materialism, a la Quine, that takes consciousness to be
merely an illusion. But if consciousness is not simply an illusion, the
mind-body dichotomy surfaces in all its presently unsolvable strangeness.
There is
no present possible position without strangeness - the radical materialist,
in denying consciousness, is one of the strangest. Against the strangeness
of these alternative positions [e.g. panpsychism] it might seem less
strange to accept the admitted strangeness of accepting a W3 and a W2 that
cannot readily be 'located', and certainly not 'located' in W1 terms.
It seems simpler to postulate that space-time belongs in w1 only?
There's the physical world, and space and time are physical 'concepts' or
entities or items.
w2 is the world of thinking.
Palma:
"Note that, if Descartes were right, thought can’t have extension
properties, such as temporal properties."
The implicature is that Descartes ain't right?
If an item in the world of 'psychology' has spatio-temporal
qualifications, it seems to me because it 'corresponds' in some way to some
item in the
physical world, which necessarily does.
w3, the world of concepts and stuff surely does not require on the other
hand any sort of Cartesian spatio-temporal coordinate. But surely the
CONTENT of a book on space and time (such as Einstein's) belongs in this 'third
reich', as Popper's predecessor also called it.
Cheers,
Speranza
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