[lit-ideas] The essence of Wittgenstein ('nuff said about the unsayable)
- From: Henninge@xxxxxxxxxxx (Richard Henninge)
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2004 05:08:24 +0100
The cross-purposes at which Donal McEvoy and Robert Paul are having at one
another is a real headache inducer.
My judgment call on this one is that McEvoy is way out of line.
Piece of Evidence the First:
RPaul says:
> > Nevertheless, 'my
> > propositions'
> > refers to propositions such as e.g. 6.432 'How things are in the world
is a
> > matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal
> > himself
> > in the world.' This is, strictly speaking, nonsensical, for it is NOT a
> > proposition whose elements CAN BE MATCHED with elements of the world.
DMcEvoy retorts in the form of a correction in passing:
> I assume you mean "cannot be matched".
I. (me) e.: DMcEvoy will (wants to) believe against all evidence that
Wittgenstein holds out no hope of anything "sayable" in TLP or his later
works, that nothing "says" anything, that the only game in town is
"showing." DMcEvoy would seem to want to deprive Wittgenstein of the least
positivistic notion, to pry him away from the Vienna Circle. When the
evidence stares him in the face, he misreads--as here where he wants RPaul
to say that Wittgenstein's own propositions about God and the world (and
about propositions) are "strictly speaking, nonsensical, for [they are] NOT
. . . proposition[s] whose elements CANNOT BE MATCHED with elements of the
world." The double neg he introduces would then mean that these
"nonsensical" propositions are "propositions whose elements CAN be matched
with elements of the world," i.e. "God," "what is higher" and the rest are
matchable to familiar elements in the world--and that's what makes them
nonsensical!
PMcEvoy goes on:
> W in a letter [Monk's biog, p.164] saw the central contention of TLP as
> follows:-
>
> "The main point is the theory of what can be expressed by props - ie. by
> language - (and, which comes to the same, what can be _thought_) and what
> cannot be expressed by props, but only shown; which, I believe, is the
> cardinal problem of philosophy".
>
> This, I suggest, remained for W the "cardinal problem of philosophy".
>
> >The propositions
> > which
> > 'can be said,' viz., 'the propositions of natural science,' and the
> > 'factual'
> > propositions of ordinary language ('The cat is on the mat') are neither
> > dispensable nor nonsensical, and it does not follow that because 'my
> > propositions' in the foregoing sense are (should be?) unsayable, that
> > atomic
> > propositions, the ultimate residue of the 'analysis' of propositions are
> > unsayable: 'The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition,
> > asserts
> > the existence of a state of affairs.' [4.21]
>
> It does not necessarily follow, but nor does it necessarily follow that it
is
> not the case. The open question, which your comment and quotation do not
> resolve, is whether an "elementary proposition" is *sayable*. If so, one
> should be able to give an example - to *state* one. No?
>
> But W states none. And your contention that "elementary propositions" are
> sayable needs more support than pointing out that this contention is, or
may
> be, consistent with recognising that other kinds of proposition are for W
not
> sayable.
Perhaps RPaul's roundabout way of "saying," with its "it does not follow
that because 'my propositions' in the foregoing sense are (should be?)
unsayable, that
atomic propositions, the ultimate residue of the 'analysis' of propositions
are
unsayable: 'The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition,
asserts
the existence of a state of affairs' [4.21]," but he follows it with a
citation from Wittgenstein's TLP in which he clearly says that ELEMENTARY
PROPS ASSERT STATES OF AFFAIRS--and that's SAYING SOMETHING (though
Wittgenstein's proposition 4.21 DOES NOT, at least in his strict view.
All this is said clearly enough by RPaul.
Perhaps the confusion DMcEvoy has is related to (t)his Denkfehler (above):
The open question, which your comment and quotation do not
> resolve, is whether an "elementary proposition" is *sayable*. If so, one
> should be able to give an example - to *state* one. No?
The question is not whether an "elementary proposition" is *sayable* but
whether it "says" X. It is the state of affairs that is sayable or not; it
is "what can be expressed (gesagt) by props--i.e by language"--not the props
themselves that are sayable. So, DMcEvoy's big "open question" as to
"whether an 'elementary proposition'" is *sayable* is a nonstarter, just a
Denkfehler (a mistake in thought).
Yet he goes on:
> To amplify: W does not explicitly restrict the propositions that cannot be
> said [I. (me) e.: as Reagan once said, "There you go again . . . ," and as
his Vice continued, "Read my lips 'not propositions that cannot be said, but
states of affairs!'"] to only the kinds of claim such as the one you mention
at 6.432, and it
> seems to me you have not clearly justified reading in any such restriction
> implicitly. One obvious counter-argument to implying any such restriction
is
> that, 6.53, W identifies "what can be said" with the "propostns
[Gesundheit!] of natural
> science". But the claim such propositions can themselves be broken down
into
> "elementary propositions" is not itself a proposition of natural science.
If
> not, it is, according to this doctrine, nonsensical.
Above, RPaul had clearly given "propositions of natural science," following
Wittgenstein, as an "example" of props that say something. McEvoy twists
this into a rule: Only propositions of natural science say the sayable, and
all else is nonsense ("according to [Wittgenstein's] doctrine"). He does,
however, then say a wise thing when he says that SAYING that "saying props"
can be broken down into "elementary propositions" is nonsensical, but that
doesn't affect the saying props' property of being saying, of saying
something sayable (thinkable--but [reminder] not of being itself sayable).
>
> This is certainly what I understand to be P's reading of the TLP, and of
> course I am, among other things, curious to know why it is, or may be,
wrong.
>
> In correspondence W said some things, which though I may not understand
them,
> *might* be taken to corroborate the view that even "elementary
propositions"
> cannot be said [This is what DMcEvoy hopes against hope is true--but it's
not] eg. [Monk, p.165] "That all elementary props [sic] are given
> is SHOWN by there being none having an elementary sense which is not
given."
> Here is an apparent claim re "elementary props" that cannot be said, only
> SHOWN.
Silly boy: You even say "re"! It is indeed an apparent claim *re*, about
"elementary props," but it is not a claim made *by* an elementary prop--THAT
would be said and not shown. I repeat: It is not a question of whether
"elementary props" can or cannot be said, but of whether they say something
or nothing.
>
> In any case your point that from the unsayability of some other kinds of
> propn. it does not necessarily follow that "elementary propositions" are
> unsayable, is - even if we concede it is true - not adequate to settle
> whether they are sayable or not. And the generality of 6.53 etc speaks
> against the view they are sayable.
=> Only if we follow DMcEvoy in believing that Wittgenstein thought that the
elementary logical props making up all nat sci props, which themselves "say"
X (and not "are sayable," our old friend the Denkfehler), don't say
anything: What kind of proposition would that be, that doesn't say anything?
>
> > [...the putative isomorphism of language and reality is something of
which
> > no
> > example is given, or can in fact be given: no example can be said, we
can
> > only
> > show there must be such an isomorphism. No? If yes, then what you say
does
> > not
> > contradict what I claimed about the bottom-level propositions into which
> > meaningful statements, acc. to W, can be analysed - that these remain
> > unsayable.]
The fact that Wittgenstein doesn't say one doesn't make them unsayable (or
unsaying, which is what DMcEvoy should mean).
Back to RPaul:
That the rules are ultimately
> unsayble.
>
>
> > [It (that there are 'unsayable rules' in the Investigations?) explains
the
> > preface's reference to Sraffa, who apparently used a Neopolitan gesture
to
> > show
> > a form of communication that lacks a [sayable] logical form, and where -
> > heavily
> > influenced by this - W writes: "I am indebted to _this_ stimulus for the
> > most
> > consequential ideas of this book". Here the _this_, perhaps playfully,
> > refers
> > again to what is shown not said.]
> >
> > The Italian economist, Piero Sraffa, discussed philosophy with
Wittgenstein
> > a
> > number of times at Cambridge. Accounts differ, but apparently once
during
> > such a
> > discussion, Sraffa made a 'rude Neapolitan gesture,' and asked
Wittgenstein
> > (who
> > had been thinking about the Tractatus notion of the general form of
> > propositions,) 'What's the logical form of _that_?' But despite the
> > playfulness
> > of '_this_ stimulus,' it was no doubt the 'many years' of criticism
which
> > influenced Wittgenstein, not this single instance.
>
> This comment goes nowhere on the substantive issue: Sraffa's gesture is
most
> obviously interpreted by W as a showing that cannot be said. This is
because
> showing/saying was W's longstanding preoccupation.
Apropos of "substantive issue": I also have my problems with Ray Monk's
sense of the essence of Wittgenstein. Take the quotation of a Russell letter
to Wittgenstein cited just before the Wittgenstein letter (cited above) in
Monk's biog, page 164: Russell writes, "I am convinced you are right in your
main contention, that logical props are tautologies, which are not true in
the sense that _substantial props_ are true" (my emphasis). Monk says of
this the following: "In fact, this was not the main contention of the
book--at least as Wittgenstein understood it [granted]. But, nevertheless,
it showed that Russell had understood what Wittgenstein was trying to say
about logic [objection, your honor!]." With all due respect, *au contraire*,
this shows that Russell believes in some kind of more substantial props than
Wittgenstein would allow. It is not that Wittgenstein is some kind of
positivist looking for facts, facts, facts. These more substantial props, if
ever produced, would resemble much more the logical tautologies Russell
seems to be dismissing: As Wittgenstein says (it's quoted on the following
page in the biog and above) in answer to one of Russell's misrepresentations
of his thought, "'It is necessary to be given the prop that all elementary
props are given.' [to this point, Russell; now Wittgenstein] This is not
necessary, because it is even _impossible_. There is no such prop! [I.e.
"All elementary props are given" is nonsense, is not so much unsayable (the
old Def) as appearing to say that which is unsayable]. That all elementary
props are given is SHOWN by there being none having an elementary sense
which is not given."
Monk follows up on this as follows (generalizing away from the specific
sense of Wittgenstein's statement [after all, Russell didn't really
understand what was wrong with what he said or what the young Austrian was
getting at either]): "Although these questions and answers relate to
specific points of logical theory [i.e. don't press me on what they are
exactly], not very far behind them lies A MORE GENERAL AND MORE IMPORTANT
DIFFERENCE. It is no coincidence that Russell's insistence on the
applicability of meta-languages abolishes the sphere of the mystical, while
Wittgenstein's insistence on the impossibility of saying what can only be
shown preserves it."
It is rather "no coincidence" that generalizing to a pseudo difference lying
somewhere behind what Wittgenstein clearly says leads one into pseudo
discussions about Wittgenstein's "sphere of the mystical" and DMcEvoy's
theory of his "two distinct doctrines of the unsayable." It is only because
Wittgenstein, the ascetic, works by negation that commentators on his works
have a tendency to people the whittled-awaý wood chips with such fantastic
forms of life. In fact, he cleaves to the bone of what can truly be said and
only that. DMcEvoy's twofold theory of the unsayable is an anatomy of
nonsense.
"That all elementary props are given is SHOWN by there being none having an
elementary sense which is not given."
Monk, McEvoy, Paul and most who have studied his works have refused to grasp
the meaning of, say, "given" in this sentence. "The three interior angles of
a triangle add up to a total of 180°." As a proposition, this is given; it
is axiomatic. It's elementary sense is also given: "That all (such)
elementary props are given is SHOWN by there being none having an elementary
sense which is not given."
This is a very plastic and discussible world of thought created by
Wittgenstein and I hate to see it dragged through such unnecessary muddles.
>
>
> > [It explains the unity and discontinuity between the earlier and later
W:
> > what
> > changes is abandonment of the idea that there is one necessary way that
> > language
> > links up to reality [the picture theory of meaning] for the idea that
there
> > may
> > be many ways, and that the ideas of 'necessity' and 'linkage to reality'
> > are
> > complex and diffuse rather than simple and singular. What abides is the
> > conviction that the deeper conditions that underpin meaning in
> > language cannot themselves be said in language, only shown.]
> >
> > How language 'links up to reality' isn't discussed in the
Investigations*,
> > although someone might say that it's 'implicitly' discussed in the
sections
> > which purport to be criticisms of the Tractatus. There is nothing that
> > 'holds
> > language up' in the later writings, in the way that the logic of the
world
> > supports it in the Tractatus. There are instead the multiplicity of
things
> > we do
> > with language. There is, I grant, the suggestion that naming a thing is
> > like
> > putting attaching a label to it [15], but is a long step from there to
the
> > conclusion that words get their meanings from the correspondence with
'the
> > world.' (The relation between a label and what it's affixed to isn't
> > mysterious.
> > We don't have to ask: how can labels do it?)
>
> These comments seem to me irrelevant. For example, I never claimed or
claimed
> W claimed that words get their meanings from correspondence with the
world.
> As with your repetition of references to bedrock practices, these points
seem
> to me - even if true - by-the-by: they are consistent with the
'unsayability'
> thesis I am defending, and thus irrelevant as criticism of it.
I hope what I have said is relevant as criticism of it. I think Robert also
had enough relevant criticisms of it to have made a little more headway than
you credit him.
>
>
> > I would like to discuss the possibility that the Tractatus makes use of
the
> > notion of a Kantian noumenal world; but this topic is too interesting (I
> > thank
> > Donal for raising it) that I'll wait to think about it a bit before
> > responding
> > further.
>
> Fine. But whether a version of a noumenal world is used or not, the main
> question - on which I find your comments unsatisfactory for reasons
given -
> is whether the essence of W's earlier and later philosophy is two distinct
> doctrines of the unsayable.
Please give us more details on your anatomy of nonsense.
>
> No strong argument against this claim has been put on the [anatomy] table
so far as I
> can see [that's like afaik, isn't it, a bit near-sighted?]; and you do not
offer plausible alternative readings for some of the
> facts that clearly appear to support this claim.
*No* facts at all appear to support your so-called claim, clearly or
otherwise!
[Sorry about the crankiness. I've just gotten tired in the process . . .
. ].
>
> Best,
> Donal
>
Richard Henninge
University of Mainz
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Other related posts:
