[lit-ideas] Re: The Worlds of Sir Karl Popper
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 8 Feb 2015 20:35:11 +0000 (UTC)
JLS' post ends>Did [Popper] ever acknowledged that perhaps he was (let's say,
'falsificationally') mistaken?>
Perhaps we should distinguish major and minor points, as it were, and here ask
the question in relation to major points (errors on minor points being of
secondary importance to errors on major ones)?
The answer is yes: one acknowledged major error is Popper's proposed definition
of 'verisimiltude', which was independently shown to be be mistaken by Pavel
Tichy and David Miller (the latter Popper's research assistant for many years).
Another major example arises in connection with another part of JLS' post:
>He wasn't waiting for the solution of problems that the invocation of these
three realms would create. Perhaps he even relished the fact that his
invocation of three worlds would create problems.
That would be odd, since he thought, Popper did, that solvable, and
reasonable, problems arise in _science_, rather than philosophy; yet the
invocation of three worlds, as McEvoy might agree, pertains to _metaphysics_,
where
'progress' is, if I may use a mixed metaphor, more obscure.>
I think Popper did indeed relish the problem-generating nature of the theory
that (in addition to W1 and W2) there is a W3. But this is not so "odd" when
seen against a very important strand of Popper's theory of knowledge, which
might be described loosely as follows.
There is a kind of position that says for every genuine problem there is a
solution [on one interpretation, we might extract this view from W in the
Tractatus - "The riddle does not exist"; or Hume, in the mode in which he was a
forerunner of Logical Positivism]. This position is refuted, we might say, by
the existence of insoluble problems [though of course the refutation can always
be evaded - either by maintaining that presently insoluble problems will
nevertheless prove soluble or by maintaining an insoluble problem is never a
genuine problem].
Against all this, Popper does think it likely that there are genuine problems
that may be permanently insoluble, though we should not be dogmatic as to what
they are - for even problems that now appear insoluble may in time be solved
(as the history of ideas shows). But he also thinks problems typically have
depth. So much so we may say that for every genuine solution (to a problem)
there is a problem i.e. that even the most successful solutions typically
create new problems - problems that arise in the light of the solution. Thus
Popper's schema of problems and (tentative) solutions, which he applies to the
growth of knowledge in all fields, does not lead to a point of finality but to
further problems requiring further (tentative) solutions.
There is a major error Popper made in his first work in relation to all this:
he at first wrongly identified the limits of rationality with the limits of
science i.e. took the position that only scientific problems could be resolved
in a rational way, whereas metaphysical/non-scientific problems could not. This
error was tied into some other errors, including the error of thinking
rationality could not ultimately be rationally based because it always involved
a prior non-rational commitment to rationality.
This major error was admitted by Popper and its correction is important to
understanding his mature philosophy. He does continue to accept that
metaphysical dispute is typically less amenable to rational solution than the
problems of science, but contends that a more-or-less rational approach is
possible even to metaphysical problems - and some would contend, on his behalf,
that his own work exemplifies the rational approach to philosophical questions.
DnlLdn
On Sunday, 8 February 2015, 13:23, "dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx"
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
In a message dated 2/5/2015 9:11:22 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
D
Waiting for time and space
Ldn
Well, space seems to be encompassed by Ldn, although it is a tricky
referential expression, if ever there was one. I think Mill discusses the
denotation (never connotation) of "London" in System of Logic (the logical
textbook for any nineteenth-century Oxonian student) and concludes that it
overlaps with what the Romans called "Londinium".
While Donal is 'waiting for time and space', one wonders about Popper.
Sometime, Popper decides that there are three worlds. He wasn't _waiting_. He
wasn't waiting for the solution of problems that the invocation of these
three realms would create. Perhaps he even relished the fact that his
invocation of three worlds would create problems.
That would be odd, since he thought, Popper did, that solvable, and
reasonable, problems arise in _science_, rather than philosophy; yet the
invocation of three worlds, as McEvoy might agree, pertains to _metaphysics_,
where
'progress' is, if I may use a mixed metaphor, more obscure.
There are paradigmatic items for each world as appealed by Popper. W1 is
the physical world of 'material objects', such as ... Eddington's Table. But
Eddington was never sure what his table consisted of. He concluded:
wavicles.
W2 is the world of the Psyche -- something so ethereal that the Greeks
represented as a female with eternal curiosity (as per Canova's statue -- I'm
actually studying the libretto to Bartok's "Bluebeard" where the references
to this topic may be seen to re-appear). W2 is the world of the soul, 50%
of philosophers agree that does not exist.
W3 is the world of objective knowledge, when Popper knows that most
philosophers take 'knowledge' to pertain to psychology, and avoid 'objective'
like the rats (This English expression, 'like the rats', shows little sympathy
for this species of mammals). It is perhaps Popper's most controversial
world.
There was once a film (a flop in London): "The World of Beatrix Potter". It
is in this spirit that I have entitled this post as I have.
So what was Popper thinking when he comes with this which he KNEW was going
to be 'controversial'. Was there progress in his view of this. Did he ever
acknowledged that perhaps he was (let's say, 'falsificationally')
mistaken?
Cheers,
Speranza
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