[lit-ideas] Re: The Rise & Fall of Somalia's Islamic Courts: An Online History (The Fourth Rail)
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Eric Yost <eyost1132@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 5 Jan 2007 16:56:41 -0330
May I ask after the grounds on which Strawson is making those claims? Is it that
he is himself claiming exemption from criteria of rational justification? And,
if so, why should we accept the truth or rightness of his claims?
Walter O
MUN
Quoting Eric Yost <eyost1132@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>:
> Phil: To be morally responsible for one's actions
> necessarily entails that one can act otherwise. If one's
> upbringing causes one to act in particular ways, then one
> cannot have acted otherwise. Therefore, there is no
> possibility of making moral judgments. To be clear, it
> isn't that one is not clever enough to articulate a moral
> judgment, but rather that there are no grounds for such a
> judgment.
>
>
> Eric: Stanford Encyclopedia has a good overview of the issue
> at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/
>
> This excerpt --on Strawson's _Freedom and Resentment_ --
> seemed particularly interesting:
>
> The central criticism Strawson directs at both
> consequentialist and traditional merit views is that both
> have over-intellectualized the issue of moral
> responsibility, and it is this criticism that has rendered
> his view so influential in subsequent work.[11] The charge
> of over intellectualization stems from the traditional
> tendency to presume that the rationality of holding a person
> responsible depends upon a judgment that the person in
> question has satisfied some set of objective requirements on
> being responsible (conditions on efficacy or metaphysical
> freedom) and that these requirements themselves are
> justifiable. Strawson, by contrast, maintains that the
> reactive attitudes are a natural expression of an essential
> feature of our form of life, in particular, the
> interpersonal nature of our way of life. The practice, then,
> of holding responsible ? embedded as it is in our way of
> life ? "neither calls for nor permits, an external
> ?rational? justification (p. 23)." Though judgments about
> the appropriateness of particular responses may arise (i.e.,
> answers to questions like: Was the candidate's behavior
> really an expression of ill will?; or Is the candidate
> involved a genuine participant in the moral sphere of human
> relations?), these judgments are based on principles
> internal to the practice. That is, their justification
> refers back to an account of the reactive attitudes and
> their role in personal relationships, not to some
> independent theoretical account of the conditions on being
> responsible.
>
>
>
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