On 1/6/07, Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: The point I wanted to
make was that certain assumptions rule out the possibility of making moral judgments. If I assume that one's upbringing causes a person to act in a particular manner, I cannot hold that person morally responsible for acting in that manner. To be morally responsible for one's actions necessarily entails that one can act otherwise. If one's upbringing causes one to act in particular ways, then one cannot have acted otherwise. Therefore, there is no possibility of making moral judgments. To be clear, it isn't that one is not clever enough to articulate a moral judgment, but rather that there are no grounds for such a judgment.
This is, in my opinion, a clear and eloquent exposition of a point with which I totally agree. But, switching subjects if I may, while using Google to search for the writings of Phil Enns I came across a reference to a paper titled ""Doing What One Means: *Wittgenstein* on *Ritual*" by Phil Enns (Toronto School of Theology). If the paper is available and could be e-mailed (or snail-mailed) to me, I would like to read it. I can offer in exchange an offprint of "Negotiating with Demons: The Uses of Magical Language" published in American Ethnologist (1995) in which you might be interested. John -- John McCreery The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN Tel. +81-45-314-9324 http://www.wordworks.jp/
