>In a message dated 1/22/2016 3:33:32 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
"It is true that some critics of Popper, like Ayer, took Popper as
proposing his 'demarcation criterion' as a criterion of meaning when Popper
never
did propose it as a criterion of meaning."
This begs a question (Most things do, though). Since _science_ *means*; so
even if Popper thought his criterion was for demarcating science vs.
nonsense (in his sense of 'nonsense') Ayer was not so off the mark.>
But Popper did _not_ (ever) propose his criterion as "demarcating science vs.
nonsense", and so Ayer is way off the mark. And so it is way off to mark to
suggest "Ayer was not so off the mark". In fact, it should amaze that Popper is
still treated as if he were some 'meaning-philosopher' despite his multiple
disavowals.
On one hand, Popper's mature philosophy understands that science originates
from non-science and thus that non-science or metaphysics is not only 'not
nonsense' but makes a most important contribution to science - it's the
feeder-system for what become theories formulated so that they are testable,
and it also sets frameworks which guide and influence what kinds of explanation
we seek in testable terms. [Hence we can take Newton, Einstein and Darwin and,
science aside, draw out a metaphysics of the world from their work].
Otoh, Popper's view is that decrying as nonsense what we can understand [e.g.
"God is merciful"] is paradoxical and unconvincing, that it leads to dogmas of
sense and nonsense that impede proper understanding of the merits of the
theories expressed, and that just as almost anything with sense can be treated
as nonsense (if we adopt a stringent enough criterion of sense) so almost any
nonsense can be given some sense if we are so inclined (as some modern poetry
proves).
In terms of people like Ayer, and the Vienna Circle, Popper saw very clearly
that there cannot be an 'empirical criterion of sense' that does not run into
the problem that no such criterion can be derived from empiricism, and so the
criterion must always be nonsense according to its own strictures [nor did
Popper accept the Tractarian view that this 'nonsense according to its own
strictures' is acceptable]. This is one of the fundamental reasons why his own
empiricist criterion was never remotely offered as a criterion of sense.
It seems to me obvious that Popper's views are much better than the rival views
above, and that those rival views - that might lumped together as versions of
"logical positivism" - ought to have collapsed in credibility under the weight
of Popper's critique. Yet the truth is that while "Logical Positivism" did
collapse partly for the reasons given against it by Popper, it also collapsed
because its 'language-based' philosophy of sense was replaced by later
philosophies of sense that were less stringent and less science-based - but
much of these later philosophies remain trapped within a framework of largely
futile 'meaning-analysis' from Popper's pov.
DL
In a message dated 1/22/2016 3:33:32 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
"It is true that some critics of Popper, like Ayer, took Popper as
proposing his 'demarcation criterion' as a criterion of meaning when Popper
never
did propose it as a criterion of meaning."
This begs a question (Most things do, though). Since _science_ *means*; so
even if Popper thought his criterion was for demarcating science vs.
nonsense (in his sense of 'nonsense') Ayer was not so off the mark.
McEvoy goes on:
"[O]ne source of this misinterpretation was that they offered their own
verifiability-criterion as a criterion of meaning and took any rival criterion
as also being a criterion of meaning. If the falsifiability-criterion were
a criterion of meaning then it would, according to itself, be meaningless
(because unfalsifiable) - but happily Popper's actual views never suffered
from this grave and obvious defect, though the verifiability-criterion did
(because meaningless according to its own strictures)."
Well, Bartley III poses a related question:
i. everything is controversial including this (i.e. (i)).
In other words.
ii. Everything is falsifiable.
Including (ii).
Ayer is a different beast, admittedly.
McEvoy:
"Ayer led this false charge against Popper in the English-speaking world.
But Popper's own critique of the verifiability-criterion predated his
awareness of Ayer and was based on (1) Popper's acquaintance with the views of
the Vienna Circle [to which he was dubbed the 'official opposition'] (2)
Popper's own failed but strenuous attempts to make a verifiability-criterion
work (not something evident from Popper's published writings but from the
reconstruction, of how Popper arrived at his published views, in Hacohen's
first-rate biography)."
Thanks.
I never, with Geary, knew why they called it a circle -- Geary told me, "I
was in Vienna, and they sat around a table, which was not even round!
Where is King Arthur, the once and future king, when one needs him?".
But McEvoy is right. Ayer and Quine were at that table (the "Vienna
Circle"). Ayer, prompted by Ryle. Quine prompted by some Harvardite, if not
Emerson.
McEvoy:
"To think Popper's _LdF_ was intended as a 'refudiation' of Ayer is like
thinking FDR proposed the New Deal to 'refudiate' Donald Trump."
This reminds me of a song by Judy Garland (also recorded by Flanagan and
Allen -- I prefer their version):
"It's a big holiday in town". A new baby was born. His name: "F. D. R."
In terms of "The End of History", it may well be argued that it is merely a
contingent matter (since there are no laws of history) that FDR did NOT
propose the New Deal to 'refudiate' Donal Trump. I drop the 'd' in Trump's
first name. Geary drops the 'p', and calls him "Trum".
Such are accents.
Incidentally, Clinton says that Palin endorsing Donal Trum can only
'redudiate' him!
McEvoy concludes:
"[W]hat Popper was doing was making a normative proposal based on very
simple (but profound) logical considerations. The value of this proposal lies
largely in how it clarifies, in logical terms, what makes science valuable
(i.e. its highly testable character). In this way, the normative proposal
throws much light on what should be described as valuable science - but it is
a proposal that remains fundamentally normative because it cannot be
derived from any facts about science (though it pertains to and illuminates
such
facts) nor derived/deduced from logic (though it amounts to a proposal as
to how to apply logical considerations to the evaluation of science)."
Mmm. Thanks. I wonder if that normativity David Home (of "Hume, Sweet Hume"
fame) would see as some sort of 'essence'. Essences are like 'ideals', as
per Kant's jargon.
So Popper is not saying what science IS, but what science SHOULD be.
Similarly Kant. He thought that what Newton was doing is what ALL
scientists SHOULD do.
Oddly, Popper ALSO focused on Newton; because he thought that since
Einstein REFUDIATED Newton, Newton's model became a 'conjecture' and it is this
"highly testable character" of Newton's theory ("an apple never falls down in
the open universe," as Einstein said) that makes Newton's theory
'scientific'.
O. T. O. H., usually the left one, Einstein's theory is hardly refudiable.
Cheers,
Speranza
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