[lit-ideas] The Proposition and the Attitude
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2013 09:30:26 -0500 (EST)
I think Grice prefers to avoid 'propositional attitude', which, he thinks,
entails a commitment to 'propositions' (even as abstract entities) and
prefers to speak of psychological attitudes -- which, granted, is a bit of a
redundancy. He uses the symbol
"ψ"
as a variable -- over 'belief', 'desire', etc. --
He also considers the idea of a 'radix', which may be relevant here:
The 'radix' in "Pierre believes that it is raining" would be
"it is raining"
In symbols
√p
---
Below, in ps, McEvoy, considers the fact that while the 'proposition' or
_content_ of an 'attitude' may be kept constant, it is the nuance of the
attitude towards it that counts.
-----
We have had no input from Phatic if we're running along the right lines, so
it may do to reconsider his scenario:
i. Pierre notes that it is raining and Pierre doesn't believe it's raining.
ii. Pierre notes that it is raining and Pierre believes that it's not
raining.
It should be noted that 'note' is a propositional attitude, like 'believe'.
I loved Forster's (and Popper's, cited by McEvoy), "I don't belief in
belief". Similarly, one may add that one does not annotate annotations (which
is admittedly clumsier in sound).
I think Julie, and also W. O. -- who talks of 'know' -- are wondering about
the evidence we may have to ascribe a propositional attitude.
The standard test is:
iii. Pierre notes that it is raining and says "It is raining"; therefore,
we are entitled to say, "Pierre believes that it is raining".
I.e. a belief, at least in functionalist approaches alla Grice, is a
theoretical term (in Ramsey's sense) that bridges the perceptual input (Pierre
observing that it is raining) and the behavioural output (Pierre uttering,
"It is raining").
In i, Pierre's noting does not yield any behavioural output, it is not the
case that he believes it is raining.
In ii, against normalcy, he decides to doubt his 'noting' and develops an
attitude towards the contradictory of his 'annotation'.
i and ii
would get represented, respectively, as
ψ1(a, √p) & ~(ψ2(a, √p)
ψ1(a, √p) & ψ2(a, √~p)
Or something. There doesn't seem to be nothing contradictory about them.
Or not.
"I don't belief in belief".
McEvoy goes on to elaborate on 'disbelief', and I would add a few
scenarios:
"He is full of negative beliefs".
"He does not hold any beliefs".
"He is full of disbeliefs".
and so on. But this may lead us towards "~".
---
Popper, "I don't belief in belief"
echoes
Socrates, "I only know I know nothing".
Or not.
On top of that, Grice prefers to speak of 'propositional complex', rather
than proposition simpliciter. In this case, 'rain' does not quite qualify as
the standard.
"The cat is on the mat"
-- The S is P --
does. Recall Strawson in "Introduction to Logical Theory": "It rains (what
is "it"?)".
The formalisation then becomes:
ψ1(a, √(the S is P)) & ~(ψ2(a, √(the S is P))
ψ1(a, √(the S is P)) & ψ2(a, √~(The S is P))
If we know use "U" to represent "Utterer" (rather than "a"), and use "A"
and "B" for any predicate, not just subject of predicate, a more realistic
formula becomes, with the iota operator to symbolise "the":
ψ1(U, √(ιAx.Bx)) & ~(ψ2(U, √(ιAx.Bx))
ψ1(U, √(ιAx.Bx)) & ψ2(U, √~(ιAx.Bx))
Note that this allows a simple consideration of things like:
Reichenbach noted that all swans are white, yet he came to disbelieve that
they were -- i.e. the predicate symbols allow us to transfer the 'iota
operator' ("the") and go on to deal with universal classes, notably "all" or
"every" -- and particular classes like "some"
ψ(U, √(∀xA.Bx))
--- While Pierre is noting things in the meadow, he comes to Pierre
believe that all ravens are black
ψ1(U, √(∃xA.Bx))
--- While Pierre is nothing some things in the zoo, he comes to believes
that some swans are black.
And so on.
Cheers,
Speranza
In a message dated 12/4/2013 5:48:53 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
>"Pierre doesn't believe it's raining" could be interpreted to mean: 1. P
disbelieves that it's raining. or
2. P has no belief that it's raining. In sense 1 then if P disbelieves
that it's raining then that may be equivalent to "P believes that it's not
raining": for 'P disbelieves p' = 'P believes non-p'.> The "may be" may be
important. Someone says to me "It's raining" and that prompts my mental state
of disbelief: this may be a different or distinct kind of a mental
state/propositonal attitude than if someone says "It's not raining" and that
prompts my mental state/propositional attitude of belief. Try it - you may
find
beliefs and disbeliefs 'feel' distinct kinds of state or attitude, even when
they are congruent in that the underlying 'propositionality' is
equivalent. So even if the proposition 'p false' = 'non-p true', the
equivalence of
these propositions may not entail the identity of congruent propositional
attitudes towards them. The attitude of believing 'p false' may be distinct
from disbelieving 'non-p false'; the attitude of believing 'p true' may be
distinct from disbelieving 'non-p true': these propositional attitudes may
seem the same for merely propositional purposes but they may not be
identical attitudes. After all, a 'propositional attitude' consists of more
than
its propositionality: equivalence of propositionality may not entail
equivalence of congruent attitudes when considered as attitudes. This may have
implications for beliefs and disbeliefs as 'propositional attitudes'.
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Other related posts:
