My last post today. Or, Oxonian Philosophy of Law. There IS a Wiki entry for Goodhart, which includes a reference: Darwall-Smith, Robin, A History of University College, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-19-928429-0. The Great Benefactor: Arthur Goodhart, pages 485–491. and so we may proceed to trace earlier 'chairs'. Or not. McEvoy: >but then Oxford didn't want Popper but gave a chair to Ayer This may be a good occasion (or not -- As Geary remarks, "For Aristotle, every occasion is a good one") to compare Oxonian philosophy of law with _things_. Cheers, Speranza ----- Some comments from http://www2.law.ox.ac.uk/jurisprudence/about.htm In that site, we read that "[The University of] Oxford [has] unparalleled strength in the philosophy of law ever since H.L.A. Hart became our Professor of Jurisprudence in 1952." Before then, the chair (since McEvoy was mentioning them) wasn't felt to be necessary (to sit). "Nearly six decades later, according to the Philosophical Gourmet Report 2011, Oxford University continues to be the world leader in legal philosophy, and by a wide margin: no school anywhere else in the English-speaking world has either Oxford's depth or breadth." Oddly, in the Latin-speaking world, it's "Roman Law" that matters! References from Wiki, "Roman law": W. W. Buckland, A Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian, Cambridge: University Press, 1921. Fritz Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946. Peter Stein, Roman Law in European History. Cambridge University Press, 1999 (ISBN 0-521-64372-4). Andrew Borkowski and Paul Du Plessis, Textbook on Roman law. Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed. (ISBN 0-19-927607-2). Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law. Rev. ed. Ernest Metzger. Clarendon Press, 2008 (ISBN 978-0-19-876063-4). Jill Harries, "Law and Empire in Late Antiquity" Cambridge, 1999 (ISBN 0-521-41087-8). Gábor Hamza, Das römische Recht und die Privatrechtsentwicklung in Russland im modernen Zeitalter In: Journal on European History of Law, London: STS Science Centre, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 20 – 26, (ISSN 2042-6402). The Oxonian site goes on: "Legal Philosophy in Oxford is an interdepartmental collaboration." Implicated: between members of the Sub-Faculty of Philosophy, and the Faculty of Law. ---- This is different from saying that 'legal philosophy' is the joint output of a philosopher and a lawyer. The site goes on: "The Law Faculty and the Philosophy Faculty, as well as the Department of Politics, contribute extensively to research and teaching in the subject, as do numerous Oxford colleges." Note that in the above, "Department of Politics" is also mentioned. It's what Geary calls a 'tri-laboration' (he restricts 'collaboration' for dyadic parties). "... as do numerous Oxford colleges" is perhaps redundant --. As a visitor was once told by Ryle: "There is no such thing as the University of Oxford; there's only Oxford colleges". He was _wrong_. The online site goes on: "The subject benefits from two dedicated University chairs," since McEvoy was mentioning them. Oddly, in one of the first universities, the one in Paris, there were no chairs -- originally: From Wiki, "University of Paris" "The medieval Latin term universitas had the more general meaning of a guild. The university of Paris was known as a universitas magistrorum et scholarium (a guild of masters and scholars), by contrast with the Bolognese universitas scholarium." ---- The Etymology Online site is useful in this respect: "chair", "meaning "office of a professor" (1816) is extended from the seat from which a professor lectures (mid-15c.)."Meaning "seat of a person presiding at meeting" is from 1640s." The site goes on to note: "chair" "as short for electric chair", is later, only "from 1900." ---- The two chairs in Oxford are "currently held by ... and ... " and then there's a "University Lecturership", "currently held by ..." The site goes on: "A dozen other permanent University posts are held by philosophers of law." "Our community of doctoral students runs [in number, not in actual activity] to 30 or more, and our courses are attended by hundreds of graduate and undergraduate students every year." "And then there are the numerous academic visitors from around the world who come to pursue their work in our uniquely conducive environment." The site proceeds to provide a pretty long list of what it labels "Oxford legal philosophers" And then there's a note on Hart, "the son of a Jewish tailor of Polish and German descent." "[Hart] was persuaded by JL Austin to be a candidate for the Oxford chair of Jurisprudence when Professor Arthur Goodhart resigned." So, one wonders if the lack of a philosophy of law in the work of Arthur Goodhart (oddly, the surname includes "hart" -- although in this case, I assume it is an etymological misspelling for 'heart', as in "good heart", and not the animal). I wonder if Wikipedia has an entry for Arthur Goodhart. It should be noted that "no philosophy of law" should count as "philosophy of law" (analogically: the sceptical, who denies such thing as philosophical knowledge, does count as a philosopher -- philosophy being a trick subject-matter). "Hart was elected and held the chair until 1969." "From 1952 on, Hart delivered the undergraduate lectures that turned into The Concept of Law (1961, posthumous second edition 1994)." "Hart also lectured on right and duties, but these lectures were never published." But they SHOULD. "He held seminars with Tony Honoré on causation, leading to their joint work Causation in the Law (1959, second edition 1985)." "His visit to Harvard in 1956-7 led to his Holmes lecture on 'Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals' (1958) and a famous controversy with Lon Fuller." "Returning to the UK he engaged in an equally famous debate with Patrick Devlin on the limits within which the criminal law should try to enforce morality." "Hart published two books on the subject, Law, Liberty and Morality (1963) and The Morality of the Criminal Law (1965)." "A wider interest in criminal law, stimulated by Rupert Cross was signalled by his 'Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment' (1959)." "Nine of his essays on the criminal law were collected in Punishment and Responsibility (1968)." Hart was "succeeded by Ronald Dworkin, a severe critic of his legal philosophy." Hart went on to devote himself "mainly to the study of Bentham, whom, along with Kelsen, he regarded as the most important legal philosopher of modern times. Ten of his essays were collected in Essays on Bentham (1982)." Hart became "much concerned to find a convincing reply to Dworkin's criticisms of his version of legal positivism." "A sketch of Hart's reply is to be found in the postscript to the second edition of The Concept of Law." ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html