[lit-ideas] Re: The Philosophy of Law

  • From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 6 Mar 2015 18:16:21 -0500

How unbehaviourist was H. L. A. Hart?

Was  his assumption, 'no psychological concepts without the behaviour that 
manifests  them', behaviourist enough?

What do we learn from the behaviour of  Pilcher and the behaviour of 
Rawlins in "Pilcher v Rawlins", 1872?

How  can it all be put in Hartian terms? In what ways are these Hartian 
terms  inferior to the alternate Popperian terms?

Crucially: did Pilcher  misbehave?

Where does the 'rule of recognition' for that fit  in?

In a message dated 3/6/2015 2:50:25 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,  
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes wonders if it is a joke that Hart saw  Pilcher.

I brought back Pilcher to the forum since the legal thread all  started 
when O. K. used a word that brought back Pilcher.

And so wouldn't  it be loverly to have Hart consider Pilcher.

So let's reconsider the  case. Hart practised law in London (W1, actually) 
after leaving Oxford with a BA  in Classics. He was considered a good lawyer 
though, because a BA Oxon Lit Hum  is a good credential for a lawyer. 
(Granted, he also took further law  examinations before being called to the 
bar).

A case study  is

Pilcher v Rawlins 


which ca be dated 1872 -- i.e.  post-Hart. On the other hand, John Locke 
could never have heard of Pilcher vs.  Rawlins.


THE FACTS.

Seven facts can be brought in.

To  talk of 'fact' here is very Hartian in that _de facto_ is opposed to 
_de jure_  and Hart would later teach Jurisprudence. This does not mean he can 
ignore _the  facts_.

Fact 1. 

Pilcher is a trustee, holding money on behalf of  a beneficiary for  
investment.

(Hart would qualify here and say that  'trustee' -- or the _use_ of 
'trustee' PRESUPPOSES -- or implicates, as I  prefer, a legal rule, and a 
primary 
one at that!)

Fact 2: 

Pilcher  is approached by Rawlins, a solicitor, who wants to borrow   money.

This is factual enough. Although Hart would say that 'neither a  borrower 
nor a lender be' may have a tacit appeal to some rule or other -- He  loved 
to quote from Shakespeare, as when he quote a friend, 'the biggest dreamer  
of all' -- a possible quote from Julius Caesar, by Shakespeare --  adapted.

Fact 3: 

In 1851, Pilcher advances money to Rawlins in  exchange for Rawlins 
executing a common law mortgage over the general law land  he owns.

This is more than a fact in that it appeals to the 'common law',  i.e. a 
primary rule in Hart's sense that presupposes a tacit 'recognition rule'  -- 
to the effect that the common law _is_ a law. 


Fact  4:  

Pilcher receives the legal title as security, subject to an obligation  to 
repay and Rawlins' equity of redemption. The transaction is legitimate   so 
far.

But Hart would hardly call it just factual. There is a reference  to a 
'legal title' which obviously refers to some 'legal rule', and the  importation 
of 'obligation' can only be understood in the context of 'rules',  primary 
and secondary. The adjective 'legitimate' is also rule-oriented, for  Hart -- 
if it means, 'legal'. 

HOWEVER, Pilcher and Rawlins now try to  defraud several others.

"This is wrong," as Hart would have  it.

Fact 5: 

Pilcher and Rawlins borrow money from Stockdale &  Lamb, trustees for other 
beneficiaries (able to loam money on interest).  

This _seems_ like a brute fact, and no appeal to a rule need be made.  
Except that if you borrow, there is a rule (recognised as such) and legal to 
the 
 effect that you have to give back. 


Rawlins agrees to give a legal  mortgage over the land, but, applying "nemo 
dat", he cannot give a mortgage to  Stockdale & Lamb because he does not 
have legal title.

This is more  than a mere fact. It involves a (legal) rule, hence the use 
of 'legal title'.  

Rawlins prepares an abstract title (list of all documents in the chain  of 
title, who has owned/leased the land).

-- or 'property' as Hart  prefers, since the idea of a 'property' depends 
on some 'legal rule' that  defines it -- whereas 'land' is neutral in this 
respect as in "Columbus LANDED  on some land in Central America").

However, Rawlins fraudulently omits to  include the  1851 transaction 
showing the existing mortgage to Pilcher.  

"This is wrong," Hart would say. While Hart was into actions that  followed 
legal rules, AN OMISSION is surely an action from the legal point of  view. 
The adverb 'fraudulently' is also legal-rule-oriented, in that it means  
that Rawlins is breaching some legal rule.

Fact 6: 

In 1856,  Pilcher reconveys the land to Rawlins without receiving repayment 
from  mortgage.

This seems factual enough. Perhaps using the more correct  'property' turns 
it into legal-rule-oriented.

However in reconveying  without receiving payment Pilcher  is in breach of 
his fiduciary duties to  the beneficiary.

This is TOTALLY legal-rule-bound! Note the use of 'duty'  which cannot BUT 
make a reference to some 'legal rule' or other.

The  fiduciaries have an equitable mortgage over the land.

This is factual  enough, unless we use the more proper 'property'. 

Fact 7:  

Rawlins now executes a mortgage over the land in favour of Stockdale  & 
Lamb.

This is _de facto_ enough. If we use 'property' instead of  'land' it 
ain't. 

The result is that Stockdale & Lamb are legal  owners, the mortgage having 
been executed in their favour.

The result is  legal-rule-oriented; hence the use of 'legal owner' and not 
just 'owner'. One  can be an 'illegal owner' (is that the implicature?)

However, the  trustees of  Pilcher have a prior equitable interest because 
the  reconveyance is in breach of  trust.

This is legal-rule oriented:  note the use of 'breach'. Trust may be deemed 
more moral than legal, though.  


---- THE ISSUE ----

sub-ISSUES

(a) Does the prior  equitable  interest prevail against the subsequent 
legal interest?
(b)  were Stockdale  & Lamb bona fide prucharsers for value without  notice?
(c) did Stockdale  & Lamb have notice?

All talk of  'issue' is legal-rule-oriented. Although journalists overuse 
the word 'issue'  and apply to almost ANYTHING. ("The issue with Madonna 
is...").

---- THE  REASONING: 

REASONING:

1.  There was no actual notice (the  title document showing Pilcher's 
fiduciary  obligations was not seen)
--  Stockdale & Lamb conducted a diligent search of  title.
2.  Constructive notice: No, a purchaser cannot be taken to  have a  
constructive notice to something fraudulently removed from a chain of   
documents 
where there was no reason to suspect that anything was amiss. The  
constructive notice does not extend to deeds removed from the chain of  title.
-- The result may have been different if Stockdale & Lamb  had  reason to 
suspect wrongdoing (e.g. if the parties were dubious) but  everything  here 
appeared normal.

Only that Hart would object to the  use of 'wrong-doing' which has a MORAL 
ring to it, whereas we should stick to  legal rules and how they are 
followed.

Stockdale and Lamb in any case  have no reason to suspect  wrongdoing.

---- THE DECISION:  

DECISION: 

Therefore, Stockdale & Lamb take legal title and  their interest is not 
subject to the Pilcher  prior  interest.

--------- 

McCormick sums this up nicely. Hart would  know about Pilcher, and Austin 
knew that the fact that Hart would understand  Pilcher was a bonus for 
Austin, qua leader of the Oxford ordinary language  'school'.

Hart's aim was HARLDY to apply the philosophy he head learned  at Oxford 
(or discussed with Ryle and Hampshire during the war) to legal  problems.

YET, McCormick adds, Hart's legal experience in the Chancery's  barrister 
manipulation with legal words to practical ends (as in the Pilcher vs.  
Rawlins -- a famous case study Hart would have come across when taking his law  
examinations) was particular relevant to the current concerns of his  
philosophical friends, like J. L. Austin and [THIS PHILOSOPHER I LIKE], for 
whom  
the study of the uses of language in practical as well as theoretical ways 
had  assumed a new urgency in the aftermath of the Second World War. And thus 
Hart's  legal experience came to be drawn into 'Oxford ordinary language 
philosophy'.  

Cheers,

Speranza



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