So, what did Hart elucidate, that court procedures are really just language games ? O.K. On Tue, Mar 3, 2015 at 4:14 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for DMARC <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > In a message dated 3/3/2015 9:52:43 A.M. Eastern Standard Time, > donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: > Though I did not bother to make explicit the importance of a case like > Pilcher for any viable 'theory of knowledge', I think anyone re-reading > those > old posts might see they present a challenge to anyone who thinks 'law' > can > be grasped via a Lockean kind of empiricism, or a Cartesian 'intuitionism' > etc. > > I think we are forgetting the _RIGHT_ approach: 'linguistic botany'. > > It was H. L. A. Hart who, in the 1950s made a concerted effort to use > developments in philosophy of language to ‘elucidate’ the nature of law. > > Hart did so with an enthusiasm for the work of Wittgenstein, and also of > Oxford ‘ordinary language’ philosophers such as J. L. Austin (and other > members of Austin's Play Group). So Hart had some advantages over Bentham > who > followed a Lockean kind of empiricism, etc. > > Cheers, > > Speranza > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html >