[lit-ideas] The Philosophical Zoo
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2007 07:31:29 EST
Schrödinger's Cat Meets Buridan's Ass
The Writing on the Wall.
Jean Buridan's "Sophismata" on self-reference
McCreery is right about the Schroedinger Katz referring to this:
_http://www.quantonics.com/Fractal_Connection.html_
(http://www.quantonics.com/Fractal_Connection.html)
Classical Fractals as Classical Sophisms
Classical sophisms are self-referent and classically recursive. As we know
from our other work regarding Buridan's Sophismata, then, classical fractals
must be classical sophisms. Why? They are, when chaotic, classically
inconsistent! Buridan and Hughes classically agree that all contextually
inconsistent
propositions are FALSE! Also, we know that classical fractals often
manufacture many (often self-similar) incommensurable islands of many truths.
To
Buridan and Hughes these are sophisms and innately FALSE!
Saying sophisms "are FALSE" is equi-valent (analogous to) saying "quantum
reality is FALSE!"
Eric Yost:
>Not I. Just Jean Buridan on Self-Reference, trans Hughes, Cambridge U
>Press, 1982
REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM:
Assume --- "I know this: 'p & ~p' is false."
If so, "I know this: 'p & ~p' is false" is not a truth-valuable
proposition. And so not something you can ASSUME
PROOF:
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ITS ASSERTION:
"I know this: 'p & ~p' is false" is true -----> a sentence conatining
the predicate 'false' would
be known.
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ITS NEGATION
"I know this: 'p & ~p is false' " is false -----> It is not the case
that I know this: 'p & ~p' is false"
COROLLARY:
"It is the case that I know this: 'p & ~p' is false" and "It is not
the case that I know this: 'p & ~p' is false" would be equivalent.
QUOD ERAT DEMONSTRANDUM:
"I know this: 'p & ~p' is false" is not a proposition.
From
_http://www.science.uva.nl/~seop/archives/fall2002/entries/insolubles/notes.ht
ml#33_
(http://www.science.uva.nl/~seop/archives/fall2002/entries/insolubles/notes.html#33)
SOPHISMA XIII:
‘Socrates knows the proposition written on the wall to be doubtful to him’,
where it is supposed that this proposition is the only proposition
written on the wall,
that Socrates sees it and is in a state of doubt about its truth,
and furthermore
knows he is in that state of doubt. Is the proposition true or not?
Since it
is stipulated that Socrates does know that he doubts the
proposition,
it would seem to be true. But how can Socrates simultaneously
know and doubt the same proposition?
SOPHISMA XVIII:
Socrates wants to eat if and only if Plato wants to eat, since
Socrates likes company at meals. But Plato is angry at Socrates and,
out of perverse spite, wants to eat if and only if Socrates does not
want
to eat. Does Socrates want to eat or not?"
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