[lit-ideas] Re: The Philosopher's Show

  • From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 2 Jul 2012 07:09:42 +0100 (BST)

The link brings up a "The requested page does not exist". No matter what the 
url says nothing more is shown.


 From: "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Sent: Monday, 2 July 2012, 5:10
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: The Philosopher's Show
This by Hacker at  
may  shed some light on the say/show distinction as we may bring Grice's 
"mean" into  the bargain.

I follow Hacker in using:

'said by  language'
'shown by language'


'meant' by  language.

The paper is rather a narrow or specific reply to Cora Diamond,  but have 
broader appeal.
Slightly commented below. Thanks to D. McEvoy for  his further thoughts. 

Hacker entitles his subsection:

"The  Tractatus — trying to say what can only be shown"

Hacker writes: "Diamond  and Conant, like Ramsey, argue (rightly) that if 
you can’t say it, you can’t say  it, and you can’t whistle it either. Unlike 
Ramsey, they think that Wittgenstein  was not trying to whistle it. On 
their interpretation, there is nothing that the  nonsensical 
of the Tractatus are trying to say, for one  cannot mean something that 
cannot be said."

"But is this what  Wittgenstein thought?"
"Since Diamond and Conant allow reference to the  ‘nonsensical’ remarks of 
TLP 4.126 - 4.1272, 5.473 and 5.4733, it is presumably  equally legitimate 
to refer to related passages in the attempt to fathom  Wittgenstein’s 
intentions. If we do so, it is immediately
evident that he did  think that one can mean something that cannot be said, 
but rather expresses  itself in a different way, viz. is shown by features 
of our  language."

ENTER Grice's "MEAN":

"Moreover, he insisted, we can  apprehend, indeed, can see some things 
which are thus meant but cannot be  said."

"As noted, he asserted that what Russell’s axiom of infinity was  meant to 
say, would (if true) be shown by the existence of infinitely many names  
with different meanings (TLP

"Similarly, what the solipsist  means is quite correct; only it cannot be 
said, but makes itself manifest (TLP  5.62)."

MODUS PONENS -- rules of inference:

"We cannot say that  ‘q’ follows from ‘p’ and ‘p --> q’, for this is an 
internal relation between  propositions. But it is shown by the tautology ‘
(p --> q). (p):-->:(q)’  (TLP

"We can recognize that a proposition of logic is true  from the symbol 
alone — indeed, that is a characteristic mark (hence an internal  property) of 
proposition of logic (TLP

"We can see that the  truth of one proposition follows from the truth of 
another, although that is an  internal relation that cannot be described (TLP 

"In complicated  cases it is difficult to see these internal relations, 
hence we need a  mechanical expedient to facilitate their recognition — viz. a 
proof (TLP  6.1262), which enables us to recognize something that cannot be 
said. In the T/F  notation of the Tractatus, we can recognize such formal 
properties of  propositions as being tautologous by mere inspection of the 
propositions  themselves (TLP 6.122)."

"So there are, according to the author of the  Tractatus, ineffable truths 
that can be apprehended. Indeed, in some cases, they  can literally be 
perceived — for one can see that dark blue is darker than light  blue, even 
though, being an internal relation
between colours, this cannot be  said."

Hacker goes on to quote from the EARLIEST Witters and how he was  already 
obsessed with the show/say/whistle distinction from his days in the  
trenches. Hacker comments that while TLP would regard "x is an object" as  
it would come out as a "rule" in PI, so what Hacker writes may relate  to 
the idea by McEvoy that the 'key tenet' holds for TLP and PI -- if broadly  
understood rather than with the details, I suppose.

And so  on.



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