In a message dated 4/20/2009 7:13:10 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, rpaul@xxxxxxxx writes: Larry Houlgate! He filled in for me when I was on sabbatical years ago; indeed, the Houlgates rented our house. One would think I'd have known what became of him, but I didn't. Until now. ---- Yes, that was interesting. I hadn't checked, in the rush, the affiliation. I see it's UCLA. I know little of Yosts, etc. Apparently, the Speranzas in the States are bankers if you believe _that_. Anyway, seems like an interesting article by "the man who rented R. Paul's house". ---- In revising cites for the OED under 'paradigm case', I see I was mistaken re: Benjamin. That's not the Benjamin author of "Remembering". The collocation, 1937 is, as I recall, "a paradigm case argument". The second citation has it with definite article, "the paradigm case" of this and that. This is funnny, but perhaps more correct. I would think that, say, if 'wife' has a paradigm case, it would have _the_ paradigm case. Sisebuta is "the paradigm case" of wife some people in Argentina. It's fun to play and joke with paradigm-cases, regardless of Walter O. --- I don't think this use is connected to Kuhn's, which would have come later. Of course, in Plato it is like 'exemplum'. Teach 'per examplum', 'exemplaris' maybe, who knows. What Larry H. is aiming at is doubly complicated by the fact that he wants to narrow to 'sceptical doubt', or something. Indeed, this seems to be the main use of the PCA: against _scepticism_ but I'd generalise it for any general claim _whatsoever_. Grice refers to Urmson as 'paradigm-case argument' in "Retrospective Epilogue". I would think he is thinking of "Some thoughts on validity". Grice seems to have seen the PCA as, well, er, ... paradigmatic of the Oxford of the day. The locus classicus seems to be our good friend N. Malcolm. And Scott Soames, who graduated, I believe as a philosopher-cum-philosopher from MIT (and thus many conservative philosphers, like me (!) don't forgive him for this Janus-faced approach to things!) has analysed Malcolm's case vis a vis Grice in "Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century". I sometimes contribute to S. Baynes' 'history of analytic philosophy' (for philosophers in the anal retentive tradition), hence my update. I would think the PCA can be formalised: OBJECTOR: There's no [insert your term]. PCArguer: Of course there's [insert your term]. One would think, "There are no material objects". "This is my hand" by Moore. Indeed, as Grice saw Lalcolm, what Malcolm did was rephrase Moore's argument 'in a linguistic key' as it were. Personally, I don't think my _hand_ is a material object, but there you are. This brings us back to McEvoy's refusal to _understand_. Give me an example of a simple thing in life, he asks. Reminds me of Kant, "Give us an example of a ding-an-sich, master". "Ding-an-sich my marbles" JLS Bolonia, etc. **************Access 350+ FREE radio stations anytime from anywhere on the web. Get the Radio Toolbar! (http://toolbar.aol.com/aolradio/download.html?ncid=emlcntusdown00000003) ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html