[lit-ideas] Re: The Logic of "Remember"
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2004 18:15:21 EST
In a message dated 11/9/2004 11:14:59 PM Eastern Standard Time,
Robert.Paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx writes:
One
might think that there was an analogy here between 'false memories' and false
beliefs (which are even easier to create). Yet although a false belief is a
real
belief which happens to be false, a so-called false memory is not a real
memory
which just happens not to be a memory of anything that really happened: it is
not a memory at all.
If we distinguish between remembering that and remembering how (similar to
the
knowing that/knowing how distinction), both memories and 'false memories'
fall
under remembering that. So, one might argue that if a memory has as its
object
some event in the past, 'false memories' are not memories for they have by
definition no such object. With knowing how it is different, as Aristotle
would
say.
Point taken. It should be false 'memories' (with 'memories' in scare
quotes), which are, as Amago notes, 'beliefs' (and false ones at that).
In a way it's like (I think it was philosopher J. L. Cohen) used to say
about flowers. A plastic flower is _not_ a flower. With other things, this
transformation does not do (and 'a plastic x _is_ an x'). Geary should be able
to
provide more conjectures and refutations, as Popper would call them.
Cheers,
JL
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