[lit-ideas] Re: The Logic of "Remember"

  • From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Wed, 10 Nov 2004 18:15:21 EST

 
 
In a message dated 11/9/2004 11:14:59 PM Eastern Standard Time,  
Robert.Paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx writes:
One
might think that there was an analogy here between 'false  memories' and false
beliefs (which are even easier to create). Yet although  a false belief is a 
real
belief which happens to be false, a so-called  false memory is not a real 
memory
which just happens not to be a memory of  anything that really happened: it is
not a memory at all.

If we  distinguish between remembering that and remembering how (similar to  
the
knowing that/knowing how distinction), both memories and 'false  memories' 
fall
under remembering that. So, one might argue that if a memory  has as its 
object
some event in the past, 'false memories' are not memories  for they have by
definition no such object. With knowing how it is  different, as Aristotle 
would
say.





Point taken.  It should be false 'memories' (with 'memories' in scare 
quotes), which are, as  Amago notes, 'beliefs' (and false ones at that).
 
In a way it's like (I think it was philosopher J. L. Cohen) used to say  
about flowers. A plastic flower is _not_ a flower. With other things, this  
transformation does not do (and 'a plastic x _is_ an x'). Geary should be able  
to 
provide more conjectures and refutations, as Popper would call them.
 
Cheers,
 
JL


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