In a message dated 11/8/2004 6:51:01 PM Eastern Standard Time, Robert.Paul@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx writes: I think it is analytically true ... that one can't, ... remember [p when p is false]. One can *seem* [my emphasis. JLS] to remember lots of things that did not _in fact_ [my emphasis. JLS] happen; this appears to be more common than remembering things correctly; but surely 'I remember the explosion but there was no explosion,' taken straight, needs some explaining. Is it the same for forgetting? Yes. 'I forgot that today was Tuesday, but it isn't Tuesday,' is on the face of it senseless. (I confess I don't understand JL's example of the student who forgets 'that Columbus discovered America in 1815.') In cases where it matters ('recovered memories' of childhood abuse, e.g.), it makes a great deal of difference whether what the alleged victim is alleged to have forgotten actually took place. If it turns out that they did not take place, then it would also turn out that the victim was not a victim after all. ---- Mmm. Interesting. I think perhaps the logic of 'remember' should provide too then for cases of 'misremembering'. R. Paul mentions 'remember correctly', as opposed, I would add, to 'remember things INcorrectly'. I would think that if one uses 'remember' (and 'memory' for that matter) loosely enough (but then why would one?) then this may have a consequence for theories of 'personal identity' -- a la Locke, Quinton, or Grice -- in "Personal Identity", Mind 1941 -- that are actually _built_ on the idea of mnemonic state. On the other hand, it doesn't seem to me that when psychologists are studying _memory_ they care a whole lot about whether the memories are, as we may call them, 'factive'? Cheers, JL ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html