[lit-ideas] Re: The King is not a subject.

  • From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sun, 26 Apr 2015 06:22:27 +0000 (UTC)

Omar writes: "If we were to conclude that all ascriptions of color were a
priori false we would have Tarski trying to derive a definition of truth from
an impossible proposition."   I would say that it is not a question of "truth
or falsity" but of assertability.  If color is the perception of wave lengths
of  electromagnetic  radiation as reflected onto the retina of a sighted
creature -- human or otherwise, then I contend that  "color" as an ens realis
doesn't exist>
Mike's view of colour as perceived wavelengths is quite compatible with
Tarski's theory of truth and compatible with the view that we can make true and
false claims about colour - these claims may be true or false claims about
colour as perceived wavelengths. There is no good argument in Mike's post for
saying that, if we view colour as perceived wavelengths, then we must abandon
talk of true and false and replace it with "assertability" - nor is there any
clear argument that shows that "assertability" could righly replace talk of
'true' and 'false', or that shows "assertability" would not raise analogous
problems to applying 'true' and 'false' and so only shift the problems.
Though Mike's view is quite compatible with Tarski's theory this is really
because Tarski's theory of truth is compatible with many different
metaphysical, philosophical positions.

While Tarski rehabilitates the notion that "'Snow is white' if and only if snow
is white" [i.e. the correspondence theory of truth], his rehabilitation leaves
open how we know "Snow is white", or whether "snow" or "white" are objects in
an external world or merely constructs of an internal world of the mind etc.
That is, Tarski's theory does not prove or disprove either some form of realism
or some form of idealism.*
Donal*That said, Popper quite legitimately brings Tarski to bear in defence of
his form of "realism": as Tarski's theory operates at a purely 'ontic' level,
independent of 'epistemic' considerations, it therefore tacitly uses a
distinction between the 'ontic'/what exists and the 'epistemic'/what can be
known, and to draw this as a distinction that can never be collapsed is in
effect to accept a form of realism.




On Sunday, 26 April 2015, 2:41, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:


It's really nonsense, I mean some people are blind and not just color blind,
so should we then conclude that vision is useless ? Blind people are dependent
on seeing people much or most of the time.

On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 2:57 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

Perhaps we might want to know how color is different from some other kind of
visual perception then, since any visual perception can be plausibly presented
as: " the perception of wave lengths of  electromagnetic  radiation as
reflected onto the retina of a sighted creature." Such alleged illusions can
help to distinguish edible food from inedible e.g., or perhaps closer to the
concerns of modern materialists, the color of money. It might help in an
'exigency.'

O.K.
On Sun, Apr 26, 2015 at 2:45 AM, Mike Geary <jejunejesuit.geary2@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

Omar writes: "If we were to conclude that all ascriptions of color were a
priori false we would have Tarski trying to derive a definition of truth from
an impossible proposition."   I would say that it is not a question of "truth
or falsity" but of assertability.  If color is the perception of wave lengths
of  electromagnetic  radiation as reflected onto the retina of a sighted
creature -- human or otherwise, then I contend that  "color" as an ens realis
doesn't exist -- a perception (a biochemical process occuring in the brain of
creature, endered as a response to a specific  stimulus occurs, yes, but we
have no way of knowing if  each person perceives the wavelengths  in the same
way. How one processes  stimuli need not necessarily  be the  is the same among
us all.  In fact we know of instances of "color blindness in which some people
perceive colors differently, such that my green is your red.  Who is correct?
What other demensions of reality might  we not be receptive of?  To make a long
story short, we don't know shit.      





Other related posts: