Sorry if D. McEvoy feels wrongly about subject-line changes -- but I was trying to focus on certain keywords. For example, he writes In a message dated 5/15/2013 12:51:04 P.M. UTC-02, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: for we have reason to believe that it is the conscious mind that 'flips' the retinal image from its physiological form and decodes it so we experience the visual field as we do when conscious - if we were rendered unconscious with our eyes open, the eyes might continue to work purely in terms of World 1 but what would be going on here would not simply be a direct reflection of what would appear to us were we conscious. --- and I relate that to certain philosophical dicta and expressions. Keywords: 'apperception', 'ego of apperception', and Grice's "Personal Identity". As per Wikipedia on apperception: Transcendental apperception is almost equivalent to self-consciousness; the existence of the ego may be more or less prominent, but it is always involved. This seems to be true of 'belief'. The phrase, "Believe the cat is on the mat" is not grammatical -- standardly interpreted -- not as imperative. The correct form is: "I believe that p" "You believe that p" "He believes that p" Similarly, to use McEvoy's example, with 'see'. "See the red box" does not make sense: "I see the red box". In "Personal Identity", Grice claims that the 'ego' gets reduced to mnemonic states. At this point, Popper's triple disjunction (World 1, World 2, World 3) claudicates (sic) against Monism. For while "I" may not be _apperceived_, but is a precondition for perception, that does not mean it lies somewhere beyond World 1 -- "my kind of world". Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html