D. Ritchie was referring to the donkey's ears. Similarly, McEvoy refers to my ears (in "Re: Duttoninana"): In a message dated 11/26/2013 12:48:12 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: "this post will also go in one of JLS' ears and out the other." No, it won't. Of course, to think (or say) that a post goes into one's (or donkey's) ears is _metaphorical_. Similarly, that a post goes out of the other (or the donkey's other) ear. ---- We were discussing the idea of 'ceteris paribus'. This became a pet topic with Grice. He would use a special symbol for this: not the 'horseshoe' (that represents 'if') but a curved arrow: p ⊃ q vs. p ≅> q The locus classicus example being: Tweety is a bird ---- Therefore, Tweety flies (but Tweety is an emu). It reads, Ceteris paribus, birds fly. ----- Grice also uses, alla Davidson (whose early work was on probability theory): ATC, birds fly. where "ATC" stands for "all things considered". Let's see what Popper's position on this is. Let's briefly summarise the context. T. Fjeld was referring to relations, some of which are causal, in examples (where the 'causal connection' does not hold): It rains today ---- Therefore, as a consequence, the sun shines tomorrow (Dutton, review of Kauffman, "Discovering the mind" -- on Heidegger). McEvoy writes: "Though unclear what is "the idea of a ceteris paribus consequence" (as opposed to the idea of a ceteris paribus clause), Popper never-ever argu[ed] that the metaphysical was ipso facto meaningless or that the irrefutable was ipso facto meaningless (nor does Popper identify the non-scientific metaphysical and irrefutable with the "anti-scientific" -- and adds: "this being as crass as identifying the non-visual with the "anti-visual". It could be said that in a binary world, the anti-visual is indeed non-visual. "Popper never-ever argu[ed] that the metaphysical was ipso facto meaningless or that the irrefutable was ipso facto meaningless (nor does Popper identify the non-scientific metaphysical and irrefutable with the "anti-scientific"". McEvoy is right in noting that the doctrine above most properly applies to the "Wiener Kreis", so-called: From wiki: "Der Wiener Kreis war eine Gruppe von Philosophen und Wissenschaftstheoretikern, die sich von 1922 bis 1936 unter der Leitung von Moritz Schlick wöchentlich in Wien trafen. Bekannte Mitglieder waren Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Victor Kraft, Friedrich Waismann und Hans Hahn. Sie wurden gelegentlich besucht von Hans Reichenbach, Kurt Gödel, Carl Gustav Hempel, Alfred Tarski, Adolph Stöhr, Willard Van Orman Quine und Alfred Jules Ayer, der ihre Arbeit in Großbritannien durch das Buch Language, Truth and Logic (1936) bekannt machte." Note that the idea of an "Oxford Circle", or a "London Circle", as opposed to the Oxford circ_us_, seems otiose. Yet, these anti-philsophical philosophers thought that they could call their thing the 'Vienna Circle' (as opposed to the Vienna Square?). I would rather call them "Vienna clubbers". ----- As Boswell said of Johnson, "he is a very clubbable man", and these Vienna Circle types also were. So we may need some clarification as to how Popper, who lived in Vienna, felt SO SEPARATE (or separated) from the infamous Vienna Circle (or not). McEvoy continues: "Given how Popper distances his philosophy from any doctrines of meaning or meaninglessness [it is part of his philosophy to attack such doctrines], it is doubtful that he would suggest the "the idea of a ceteris paribus consequence" (whatever that means) is "meaningless". On top of that, there is no exact Viennese expression for the rather abused term, "meaningless". When Max Black thought of translating Frege, "Sense [i.e. Meaning] versus Reference", we were never sure if "Sinn" is what Popper has in mind when he says that he is distancing his philosophy from any doctrine of MEANING [sense?]. ---- "it is doubtful that he would suggest the "the idea of a ceteris paribus consequence" (whatever that means) is "meaningless"" ------ But I don't think he considers the issue in his infamous book, "LdF" -- if infamous is the word. The idea of a ceteris paribus clause seems to figure large, as Davidson notes, in scientific discourse of various types, and it is subjected to analysis too, by Kneale in "Probability and Induction". Grice distinguishes between, "Probably, if it rains today, the sun will shine tomorrow" from "Desirably, if it rains today, the sun will shine tomorrow" and goes on to discuss how these statements can attain some level of universality if not objectivity -- in "Aspects of Reason". It may relate to Reichenbach, whom Popper may have discussed (or not). Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html