http://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/aug/21/richard-dawkins-apologises-downs-syndrome-tweet Part of the "apology" reads: "Those who took offence because they know and love a person with Down's syndrome, and who thought I was saying that their loved one had no right to exist, I have sympathy for this emotional point, but it is an emotional one not a logical one. It is one of a common family of errors, one that frequently arises in the abortion debate." Perhaps I have misunderstood; but to say a person with Down's syndrome has a right to exist seems no more perforce "emotional" than denying they have a right to exist; and, conversely, it seems no more perforce "logical" to say such a person has no right to exist than to say they have a right to exist. The underlying issues are moral ones - not a "logical" one, and not merely an "emotional" one (though perhaps affected by emotional responses). For my part I do not think a person having Down's syndrome means their life would be less worthwhile than otherwise; and do not see a clear "logical" basis - rather than an emotional one - as to why such a person should be a greater candidate for abortion than a person without Down's syndrome (whereas a foetus with a condition that would mean their life would only be short and painful if born might be a greater candidate for abortion on moral grounds). The commonest family of errors from the pro-choice lobby is to make the mistake of thinking that choices cannot be mistaken, even gravely mistaken: even if we accept that a 'pro-choice' position of some sort is better than no choice, that does not mean we need accept that the resultant choices may not be mistaken (and sometimes even immoral). Having the right to decide does not mean what we decide is right. It seems to me a world without any persons suffering from Down's syndrome (because abortion was used to prevent their birth) would be far from morally preferable to a world where persons with Down's syndrome were never aborted: but also that it does not follow from this that we should have laws that mean there is no choice as to whether to abort a foetus with Down's syndrome. The problem is that setting the terms of "choice" almost inevitably permits bad and immoral choices. There seems to me an arrogance of a sort that seems endemic within sections of academia in a statement like Dawkins', with its misuse of a putative contrast between "logical" and "emotional" to give a pseudo-intellectual air to Dawkins' personal morality. I should note that I am an admirer of Dawkins' books on evolutionary theory but one who often finds him quickly out of his depth on moral and philosophical matters. I have known people with Down's syndrome and one of their great assets is that they lack the kind of arrogance too often found in their intellectual (but not moral) superiors. We could learn a lot from them on this and other things. Dnl Ldn On Wednesday, 20 August 2014, 18:19, David Ritchie <profdritchie@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: On Aug 20, 2014, at 8:18 AM, cblists@xxxxxxxx wrote: > > > > From this week's Harper's Weekly Review (August 19, 2014): > > "A Portland, Oregon, man called police to report a chicken crossing the road > ..." > > http://harpers.org/blog/weekly-review/ > > Is there something you're not telling us, David? I checked the footnote. This happened in north Portland, where issues are different. Hereabouts, as you know if you've been following my accounts, direct action has not been the order of the day. In fact road crossing qua crossing is the sort of thing that gets sent to committee for further discussion. But there are currently hints this could change. More on Sunday. David Ritchie, poulet wranglaire, Portland, Oregon------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html