[lit-ideas] Re: The Causal Theory of Perception
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 2 Mar 2014 14:42:54 -0800 (PST)
Another question that might be put forward is something like this:
Would an analytic statement like "Bachelors are unmarried males" be true in a
possible world in which bachelors don't exist ?
If so, "unicorns are one-horned animals" must also be accepted as analytic.
O.K.
On Sunday, March 2, 2014 6:38 PM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Well, since this is not the first time that this example comes up: the
ontological status of Banquo's ghost, and other ghosts, within the world of
Shakespeare's plays is far from clear. It may be that, in the world of the
play, seeing Banquo's ghost is seeing Banquo. It may be that, in the world of
the play, we are intended to accept the apparition as real within the world of
the play and not just Macbeth's hallucination. Outside the world of the play,
of course neither Macbeth nor Banquo are real, but that is applying a
different, external standard of being real.
O.K.
On Sunday, March 2, 2014 6:11 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
>I prefer: the dogma that there is an analytic-synthetic distinction.
He (or they) are of course, opposing, Quine.
It's not clear to me if in McEvoy's parlance, 'analytic' versus
'substantive' we are suggested that we adopt a different type of distinction.>
There are different ways of understanding the analytic-synthetic distinction,
but when I speak of analytic-substantive I mean a version of the
analytic-synthetic distinction.
In this version, a substantive or synthetic claim is one that is true in virtue
of its correspondence with 'facts' - 'facts' that hold/'are the case' 'in
reality'. An 'analytic' claim is one that is true merely by virtue of the
stipulated meaning of the terms in the claim.
As an 'analytic claim' must be true without reference to any 'facts' beyond the
meaning of its terms, the truth of an analytic claim cannot depend of any
'facts' that hold 'in reality', and so its truth cannot tell us anything about
what holds 'in reality'.
Whether a claim [e.g. "All atoms are particles"] is analytic or synthetic,
cannot be deduced from its logical form but depends on the methods used to
defend it.
Donal
On Sunday, 2 March 2014, 15:43, "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> wrote:
In a message dated 3/2/2014
8:16:19 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
even if we mean a CTP as a substantive claim, just because we mean some
CTP does not mean that CTP is true: its substantive truth, as it goes beyond
anything ‘analytic’, cannot be established by reflections on ‘meaning’.
All this appears to be skimmed over in JLS’ response...
I would try and elaborate further on the distinction being addressed here,
plus a methodological point by Grice.
Grice, as we know, wrote with Strawson, "In defense of a dogma".
Where the dogma is the
analytic-synthetic
distinction.
Or the analytic.
The dogma of analyticity.
I prefer: the dogma that there is an analytic-synthetic distinction.
He (or they) are of course, opposing, Quine.
It's not clear to me if in McEvoy's parlance, 'analytic' versus
'substantive' we are suggested that we adopt a different type of distinction.
But I will think about McEvoy's point about the possible contradiction
that, for any proposition 'p',
'p' cannot be BOTH analytic and 'provide a
substantive truth'.
I tend to associate 'substance' with Aristotle, and the very idea of the
substantive, perhaps after discussions with Geary (who is an
Aristotelian-cum-Thomist), can only, alas, confuse me. I tend to
oppose 'the substantive'
to the 'adjectival', but Geary disagrees.
The methodological point had to do with Grice's manoeuvre re: 'see'. He
wants to stick with
Do not multiply senses beyond necessity.
And on one page of Way of Words considers 'see' and postulates that it
would be VERY WRONG on the part of some philosopher (I think he is meaning L.
J. Cohen, of Queen's, Oxford) to think that 'see' is polysemous and has
different 'senses'; one in "I saw a goldfinch in the backyard", or "I saw
fairies at the bottom of the garden" (indeed Wittgenstein's garden), and
Shakespeare ("And then I conceived of a great scene where Macbeth would see
Banquo, where," as he goes on to tell
to Wriothesley, "as you and I know, Banquo
was not there *to be seen*" (emphasis Shakespeare's).
So next I should reconsider McEvoy's formulation of the 'reductio
ad
absurdum' if that's what it is for Grice and proceed!
Thanks to McEvoy for the further thoughts.
Cheers,
Speranza
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