[lit-ideas] Re: The Causal Theory of Perception
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 2 Mar 2014 13:15:26 +0000 (GMT)
Thanks to JLS for his last post.
To isolate one central idea, in the post to which JLS
responds, there was one
italicised as follows:-
“a claim cannot be at
once true simply by virtue of the stipulated meaning of terms and at the
same time true because it corresponds to some substantive facts”.
If this is correct, we are left with a dilemma. Either
Grice’s CTP is merely a stipulation as to what we mean when we say someone
perceives something or it is a substantive
claim about what is actually involved
when someone perceives something. It cannot be both at once i.e. simultaneously
a mere ‘meaning-claim’
and a substantive claim.
As a mere ‘meaning-claim’, a CTP is substantively empty.
Moreover, even if we mean a CTP as a substantive claim, just because we mean
some CTP does not mean that CTP is true: its substantive
truth, as it goes beyond anything ‘analytic’, cannot be established by
reflections on ‘meaning’.
All this appears to be skimmed over in JLS’ response, which
fails to explain how Grice’s CTP escapes the dilemma. (I suggest that Grice is
involved in the typical ‘analytic’ dodge of trying to escape metaphysics when
the substantive problem addressed by a CTP is inescapably a metaphysical one.)
So, for reasons indicated in my post, we cannot move from a
‘meaning-claim’ CTP to a substantive CTP by any valid means:- for these are,
logically, very distinct claims. They are logically very distinct in the same
way that “All swans are white” as an ‘analytic’ [or ‘meaning’] claim is very
distinct, logically, to “All swans are white” as a substantive factual claim –
obvious given how an apparently non-white swan cannot logically falsify the
‘analytic’ but may logically falsify the ‘synthetic’/substantive version of
“All swans are white”.
A fortiori we
cannot move from a mere ‘meaning-based’ CTP to a substantively true CTP.
As a substantive claim, the CTP inescapably raises
metaphysical issues as to the reality of an ‘external world’ and its impact on
the ‘internal world’ of our experience. Here we run almost immediately into the
issue, raised by Hume’s philosophy, that our commonsense realism appears to
conflict with what we may call the ‘commonsense theory of knowledge’: an
underlying and fundamental conflict obscured and not resolved by Grice’s
‘analytic’ dodge.
Dnl
Ldn
P.S. The above is not invalidated by any of the many
meanings of meaning, or the fact more than one such ‘meaning’ is used; but it
should
perhaps be emphasised that Popper is a proponent of logical analysis and so it
is wrong to suggest he is opposed to ‘analysis’ in this sense – what Popper
opposes is the search for mere ‘analytic’ truth and the defence of
‘truth-claims’
using mere ‘analytic’ or meaning-based methods. This opposition is itself based
on his logical analysis of what is at stake here. (And, re the ‘paradox of
analysis’, Popper is scathing about Moore and kind of paradigm of ‘analysis’
that Moore established when criticising some work by Russell).
On Sunday, 2 March 2014, 2:03, "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> wrote:
My last post today.
In an earlier post, in a message dated 2/12/2014 5:17:31 A.M. Eastern
Standard Time, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx refers to things like:
>I see that the black cat is on the red mat.
---- Therefore, the black cat is on the red mat
----- and the black cat's being on the red mat accounts for my seeing the
black cat is on the red mat.
and quotes my:
>Grice holds this is 'analytic' (after all, it IS an 'analysis' of "I see
>that"); McEvoy seems to hold it's synthetic.>
McEvoy wonders:
>What makes something ‘analytic’ rather than ‘synthetic’?
He then proposes some interesting substantive argument for the 'synthetic'.
McEvoy writes:
>Take “All swans are white”: is this ‘analytic’ or ‘synthetic’? We may
be inclined to take it as ‘synthetic’, as >stating a ‘fact’ about the
world: a ‘fact’ that is not true by logical necessity (for it is surely
logically possible >that there could be blue swans?). Nevertheless “All swans
are white” could also be defended as ‘analytic’: if >someone defends “All
swans are white” (against evidence of a ‘black swan’) by saying a supposed ‘
black >swan’ cannot be a swan because “All swans are white”, they are not
contradicting themselves – but their >defence turns “All swans are white”
into an ‘analytic’ claim, based on it being part of the meaning of “swan”
>that it is “white”, so that a non-white swan becomes (by this
stipulation as to meaning) a logically >impossible structure.
I actually prefer the example,
"All ravens are black"
--- I think it is indeed, granted, J. L. Austin, who uses the 'swan'
example. Oddly, an Argentine variety of swan is part white, part black
('black-necked swan'). The same complications do not seem to apply to
Reichenbach's
(I think) original idea of a nomonologico-deductive piece of reasoning:
All ravens are black
This is a raven
---- Therefore this is black.
---
McEvoy continues:
>There is nothing to stop anyone defending a CTP in a similar way: so a
CTP becomes ‘analytic’ – true by a >kind of stipulation as to what it means
for a perceiver to perceive an object.
For the record, note that my application of 'analytic' was for the
entailment regarding the existence of 'what is seen'. But I like this idea of
expanding the range or alleged range of the 'analytic'.
McEvoy goes on:
>But, in this form, a CTP is devoid of synthetic content and tells us
nothing about the world but only about >what we must (so we are told) mean. It
is empty philosophising to make one’s point by this kind of >definition of
terms or stipulation, because it tells us nothing more than that we have
defined or stipulated >in a certain way.
I think this underestimates the point about 'mean'. "Mean" has different
'usages':
"Those spots mean measles"
is one usage.
"He meant a great truth", said of Zarathustra -- is another.
Meanings, unlike apples, don't just grow on trees.
---
McEvoy generalises:
>Yet many philosophers seem to be under the illusion that they are doing
something far from empty when >they engage in this kind of ‘argument’. Here
their confusion is akin to the confusion in someone who >defends “All
swans are white” by ‘analytic’ means (i.e. as a conceptual or definitional
truth), yet thinks in so >doing they have nevertheless revealed something of
substantive, essential importance as to the colour of >swans: they haven’t at
all – given how they defend their claim, all they have shown is that they
will not call >a non-white entity a ‘swan’ (irrespective of all the other
respects in which it seems ‘swan-like’).
As I say, the point may be different with ravens.
Wikipedia tells us about the common raven:
Scientific classification
Kingdom: Animalia
Phylum: Chordata
Class: Aves
Order: Passeriformes
Family: Corvidae
Genus: Corvus
Species: C. corax
Binomial name
Corvus corax
Linnaeus, 1758
So I think Linnaeus was into something 'analytic' when he said that Corvus
corax was _black_.
McEvoy goes on:
>This confusion has a long history in the story of philosophy. It is a
confusion that seems to lie at the root of >much so-called ‘analytic philosophy
’: where this claims to be exhibiting substantive, >‘essential’
(conceptual) truths while at the same time defending these truths merely by
kinds of
stipulation. >(As prime and typical examples of this kind of confusion, we
might mention both Strawson’s and Ayer’s >‘analytic’ defence of
induction).
A related sort of criticism concerns the so-called 'paradox of analysis',
about which I wonder if Wikipedia holds an entry. The idea being that an
analytic philosopher is engaged into a sort of paradox if he is trying to
stipulate something MORE than a mere stipulative definition of stuff.
----
McEvoy relates this to a favourite pet of of this list: the analysis of
knowledge as justified true belief:
McEvoy:
>If I am not mistaken, we have seen this confusion in those who wish to
defend JTB-theory as having something substantive to say about the essential
character of “knowledge” >while defending their position by a kind of
stipulation – so that “false scientific theories” cannot refute their
>JTB-theory because, if false, such scientific theories are deemed not to
constitute “knowledge” (this >manoeuvre parallels the stratagem of deeming an
apparent ‘black swan’ as not a swan because it is black: >a stratagem that may
be used to defend “All swans are white” from refutation by counter-example
but which >must simultaneously empty “All swans are white” of substantive
content).
Black-necked swans or totally black swans (as are common in some zoos and
in the Australasian wild) seem to have refuted the view. An albino raven,
however, is, er, a different ANIMAL. It may be part of a common raven's
genome that the bird should be black.
McEvoy:
>The story of how ‘analytic philosophy’ has managed, time and again, to
get thoroughly confused (and to >confuse others) on this issue is also a
long one: but the counter-thesis is simple – a claim cannot be at >once true
simply by virtue of the stipulated meaning of terms and at the same time true
because it >corresponds to some substantive facts.
>So Grice is free to defend a CTP in ‘analytic’ terms just as anyone is
free to defend “All swans are white” in >‘analytic’ terms: but it is an
illusion that in so doing we are throwing any substantive light on,
respectively, >the essential causal role of objects in perception or the
essential
colour of swans.
>The only substantive interest a CTP might have is if it is ‘synthetic’.
And, as a ‘synthetic’ claim, it is not a >claim that must be true by any
kind of logical necessity. For there is no logical contradiction or logical
error >in denying any of the following aspects of a CTP: (a) that there are
“objects” external to perception (b) that >“objects” external to
perception must play some causal role in their perception. That is: it is
logically >possible (a) that there are no “objects” external to perception;
(b)
that “objects” external to perception play >no causal role in their
perception.
This is a good move and reminds me of Stephen Yablo when he said,
"Implicature happens". Oddly, Grice has the notion of 'disimplicature' that may
turn his theory non refutable in that someone who uses 'see' without an
entailment concerning the existence of 'what is seen' is 'disimplicating' what
he
should otherwise not?
McEvoy continues:
>That these possibilities are not ruled out by ‘logic’ does not get us
far: for neither are their negations ruled >out by ‘logic’. But it is itself
a kind of fundamental logical error to try to defend a position, on which ‘
logic’ >does not rule one way or another, as if it is the only logical
position: even if the position we are trying to >shore up this way is correct,
to try to shore it up this way tends to further confuse matters.
>The position as regards a CTP is really this: commonsense is correct in
taking it that there is an ‘external >world’ of “objects” and that these “
objects” play some causal role in our perception of them. But, beyond
>this, commonsense tends to go astray:- because commonsense tends to a kind of
naïve or direct realism >as to how we perceive these objects and also tends
to naïve views of ‘causation’: after all [and special >cases (like
hallucinations) aside], we tend to perceive the ‘external world’ as if
something
like naïve or >direct realism were true.
Oddly, it seems it is these kind of hallucinations that seem to involve
most type of 'disimplicatures' regarding 'see'. Grice's two examples are
hallucinatory in kind:
Macbeth saw Banquo (where Banquo was not there to be seen) -- from
Shakespeare's play "Macbeth".
Hamlet saw his father in the ramparts of the castle of Elsinor -- from
Shakespeare's play "Hamlet".
Grice grants that in these cases, 'see' is used without the utterer
committing himself, as per an entailment, to the existence of 'what is seen',
since it is common ground that neither Banquo nor Hamlet's father where there
to be seen.
Grice should have considered other perceptual verbs, as when we say, "He
hears voices" (meaning the equivalent of the 'hallucinatory' use of 'see',
rather than when there ARE voices to be heard).
But then, Grice was possibly concerned with this in an earlier stage of his
career: "I am hearing a sound" is, as I recall, the example of choice in
his analysis of "Personal Identity" back in 1941.
McEvoy:
>We perceive it this way because the vast ‘trial-and-error’ processes
that underpin >the workings our >perceptual apparatus are not transparent in
the resultant ‘perception’. There are also >strong psychological,
>neuro-physiological and even cultural factors that incline us to something
>like a
naïve >or direct realism – at >least before we critically reflect on the
detailed ‘trial-and-error’ workings of our >perceptual apparatus. All of
>this tends to obscure from us the fact that our belief in an ‘external world’
with >causal affects, though >correct, is a metaphysical faith:- it cannot
be demonstrated by ‘logic’, nor can it be >demonstrated by >examining the
character of perception as we experience it in our ‘internal world’ – for
that >‘internal world’ is >compatible with there being no ‘external world’
, and it is also compatible with there being >an ‘external >world’ which
has no causal affect on our ‘internal world’.
---
I am glad that McEvoy uses 'trial-and-error' in quotes, or scare-quotes as
Geary prefers, since I am inclined to regard the use of 'trial' and 'error'
as applied to subpersonal 'verbs' rather anthropomorphic in character -- I
think the Wikipedia has this as a homuncular fallacy (or not).
McEvoy:
>It is part of commonsense that our ‘commonsense realism’ is correct: yet
it is not part of unreflective >commonsense to even identify this ‘
commonsense realism’ as such – it is rather a part of our outlook that >we
tend
to take for granted. (Philosophy may jolt us from taking it for granted by
raising alternative >possibilities e.g. that there is no ‘external world’).
Given that commonsense realism is generally part of >unreflective
commonsense, it is perhaps not surprising that it is not part of commonsense to
reflect >carefully on the status of commonsense realism – and so it is not
perhaps surprising that it is not part of >commonsense to consider the status
of ‘commonsense realism’ as being a form of ‘metaphysics’ (rather >than
some kind of demonstrable, proven or testable knowledge). Given how deeply we
tend to take >commonsense realism for granted, it may be something of a
jolt in commonsense terms to realise that this >‘realism’ is a part of our
metaphysical framework.
>(N.B. As ‘metaphysics’, the arguments – though inconclusive – still
favour commonsense realism as >against its negation).
>Grice is wrongheaded in seeking an ‘analytic’ basis for this commonsense
realism in a CTP, because our >commonsense realism is of a substantive,
synthetic character. His approach tends to blind us to the fact >that we
should recognise there are limits to the validity of a commonsense approach,
which may be correct >in its commonsense realism but which tends to lead us
astray in understanding the status of this >commonsense realism (because of
a naïve and mistaken ‘commonsense theory of knowledge’). Grice’s >approach
tends to the error of thinking this commonsense realism is validated by
the meanings of our >words: but this is wrong, because, first, commonsense
realism has a substantive, synthetic and not merely >‘analytic’ character;
and, second, commonsense realism is not so much built into the meanings of
our >words as built into the very framework we hold prior to our using any
words and indeed hold prior to having >any ‘experience’ formed by input
from an ‘external world’; and, third, even if this commonsense realism is
>reflected in the sense of the language we use to describe acts of perception,
that would not validate it – no >more than my referring to an “object”,
in a way that the sense of “object” is that it belongs to an ‘external
>world’, validates that there is an ‘external world’.
In "Annals of Analysis" (I think the title is) Travis, when reviewing
Grice's opus magnum, "Way of Words" does make a point that 'analysis' is too
entrenched in Grice's scheme of philosophyising, but then, since Phatic was
also mentioning, so was in Plato's, if not Socrates's (if not Hermogenes).
On the other hand, there's Popper, for whom 'analysis' is NOT the keyword
to philosophy (or the key to philosophy, if you want) -- vide Magee.
Thanks to D. McEvoy for his further thoughts.
Cheers,
Speranza
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