In a message dated 1/2/2010 9:35:29 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: The fact "Snow is white" is (assumimg it true a statement) independent of the expression "Snow is white". Its truth is, in this sense, "individuated independent of propositional form", even if _expressing_ such a truth is not. ---- Part of the problem is crossnational. Tarski was a Pole, but he wrote in German. The famous (or infamous as I prefer) utterance, originally in Polish is: nievska es albaska which he translated to German, "Schnee ist weiss" "Wahrheit in Formalisierte Spraeche". In English, this comes out, naturally, or non-naturally as Grice preferred (WoW, ii) as "Snow is white". Grice tried to think for a context in which Tarski's statement would make sense. He failed. Grice also noted that Tarski fails in 'embedded contexts', as Grice calls them. "Suppose a policeman tells me, "Snow is white". I tell my son, "What the policeman told me is true". This harmless statement is impossible for Tarski to formalise, therefore, he thought, it would be senseless". Indeed, if 't' is true iff t -- does not yield (1) What the policeman told is true iff ...? "What the policeman told me is true. If," adds Grice, "what transpires is that what the policeman told me is that monkeys can talk, then I deny that what the policeman said referred to a 'fact'" On the whole Grice endorsed his pupil Strawson's theory of "Truth" which Strawson (later Sir Peter) presented in a reply to J. L. Austin, in, of all places, "Bristol". Grice would reminisce, "I have good memories of Bristol". And he did, since he was an old Cliftonian. Cheers, JL