You and John have certainly framed the philosophical morality issue far better than I could reach for. There are so many nearly satisfying solutions (philosophically, logically, spiritually, physiologically) and all far short enough to lead back to the vicious cycle. OUT! OUT! Julie Krueger knowing how hamsters on the wheel feel ========Original Message======== Subj: Re: [lit-ideas] Re: T'AINT FUNNY, MCGEE Date: 12/8/2006 10:59:28 P.M. Central Standard Time From: _rpaul@xxxxxxxxx (mailto:rpaul@xxxxxxxx) To: _JimKandJulieB@xxxxxxxx (mailto:JimKandJulieB@xxxxxxx) Sent on: Julie writes: > In the absence of religion, where is an > generally decided on moral value to come from? The inherent human instinct? Consider this. People have done the vilest things in the name of religion. This is simply a fact. Where, then, does the notion that such things were vile come from? 'Well, they misinterpreted what God (or the gods) wanted humans to do.' Yet why the urge to say this? Why not simply say, 'They have a religion, and the tenets of that religion tell them to do what they do'? 'But what they do is plainly wrong, so there's either a moral defect of some sort in their religion, or they've misinterpreted the gods' instructions.' At some point, the brute notions of right and wrong will either be grounded in religion or they won't. If they're grounded in religion, they will either--as in an imagined case in which humans are painfully sacrificed--be morally assessable, or they won't. If they are, the assessment will either begin from another religious point of view (Unitarians would probably consider the painful sacrifice of human beings wrong) or it won't. And so on until we reach bedrock. However, if the 'bedrock' is (some) religion, it will still always be possible to evaluate the tenets and precepts of that religion from 'outside.' If the answer to a moral complaint about the teachings of a certain religion is that those who interpret its teachings in a certain way have got it wrong (so that it's just a mistake to see that religion as e.g. requiring painful human sacrifice), such an answer would seem to require another moral point of view upon which the complaint and this answer both depend. We might do a slow reading of the Euthyphro. Robert Paul The Reed Institute