professor McEvoy appears to deny that there are inferences. It is a very interesting view. For instance it follows that since tlp and t do not state that Mcevoy is blu, he is likely to be possibly blu On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 7:03 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > The "full section" quoted does not explicitly make the claim attributed to > W, nor is any explanation supplied so we might see how this claim might be > derived from the section quoted. > > I mean surely if Palma says so then the Bible claims that London hotel > rooms can tonight be had for as little as £3.99, and this is shown by the > "full section" "In the beginning was the light..." > > Dnl > Ldn > > > On Thursday, 19 June 2014, 15:50, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > a full section was quoted for the delight of the upset reader who finds > anything "cobblers" > > > On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 3:48 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> > wrote: > > > >For W. the opposite is the case "the tree is growing" is a fact > ontologically prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree.> > > This sounds to me like just the kind of cobblers that both the early and > later Wittgenstein were dead against. In case I am mistaken about this, and > this is in fact what is claimed as "the case" "For W.", please could > someone explain how _from Wittengenstein's writings_ we arrive at the claim > '"the tree is growing" is a fact ontologically prior to the alleged "thing" > called growth or tree." > > If this claim is in W's writings I appear to have missed it. > > DnlLdn > > > On Thursday, 19 June 2014, 7:56, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > the point can be read, easily, as being non trivial. > For, consider that the realm of the expressible is the realm of the real, > give or take some fluff about the unsayable etc. > what is expressible is propositionally structured, hence it is a *thought* > (see G. Frege Gedankefuge, in LU.) > It follows that things, independently from how ro who refers to "things", > are not the what the totality of the world is. > Whether this is true or false, lemme know. By my counts most people think > there are things (they have in mind pens, trees, cars, houses, sometime > even stars and atoms) and believe that "facts" are mental constructs of > some sort. > For W. the opposite is the case "the tree is growing" is a fact > ontologically prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree. > > > > > On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 12:19 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> > wrote: > > I will try to post in the coming days some W. passages with questions / > comments. I apologize that the comments will likely be brief, as I am in a > rather gloomy mood these days. The passages will probably be from the > Tractatus and the PI. (I haven't got access to the Blue Book.) > > Tractatus 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things. > > First, it is not entirely clear what is meant by the facts/things > opposition, but I suppose that what is meant is mental facts, as opposed to > material things. If so, where is the argument for this ? I mean, the > materialist / idealist debate has been going on in philosophy since the > pre-Socratics, so what makes W. think that we should accept his take on the > matter just on his say-so ? It is not given as an axiom, as in Spinoza for > example, instead it is pronounced by fiat. > > O.K. > > > > > -- > palma, e TheKwini, KZN > > > > > > > > > > > > > palma > > cell phone is 0762362391 > > > > *only when in Europe*: > inst. J. Nicod > 29 rue d'Ulm > f-75005 paris france > > > > > > > -- > palma, e TheKwini, KZN > > > > > > > > > > > > > palma > > cell phone is 0762362391 > > > > *only when in Europe*: > inst. J. Nicod > 29 rue d'Ulm > f-75005 paris france > > > > -- palma, e TheKwini, KZN palma cell phone is 0762362391 *only when in Europe*: inst. J. Nicod 29 rue d'Ulm f-75005 paris france