[lit-ideas] Re: Some Wittgenstein passages

  • From: palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 16:50:48 +0200

a full section was quoted for the delight of the upset reader who finds
anything "cobblers"


On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 3:48 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:

>
> >For W. the opposite is the case "the tree is growing" is a fact
> ontologically prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree.>
>
> This sounds to me like just the kind of cobblers that both the early and
> later Wittgenstein were dead against. In case I am mistaken about this, and
> this is in fact what is claimed as "the case" "For W.", please could
> someone explain how _from Wittengenstein's writings_ we arrive at the claim
> '"the tree is growing" is a fact ontologically prior to the alleged "thing"
> called growth or tree."
>
> If this claim is in W's writings I appear to have missed it.
>
> DnlLdn
>
>
>   On Thursday, 19 June 2014, 7:56, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
> the point can be read, easily, as being non trivial.
> For, consider that the realm of the expressible is the realm of the real,
> give or take some fluff about the unsayable etc.
> what is expressible is propositionally structured, hence it is a *thought*
>  (see G. Frege Gedankefuge, in LU.)
> It follows that things, independently from how ro who refers to "things",
> are not the what the totality of the world is.
> Whether this is true or false, lemme know. By my counts most people think
> there are things (they have in mind pens, trees, cars, houses, sometime
> even stars and atoms) and believe that "facts" are mental constructs of
> some sort.
> For W. the opposite is the case "the tree is growing" is a fact
> ontologically prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree.
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 12:19 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
> I will try to post in the coming days some W. passages with questions /
> comments. I apologize that the comments will likely be brief, as I am in a
> rather gloomy mood these days. The passages will probably be from the
> Tractatus and the PI. (I haven't got access to the Blue Book.)
>
> Tractatus 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
>
> First, it is not entirely clear what is meant by the facts/things
> opposition, but I suppose that what is meant is mental facts, as opposed to
> material things. If so, where is the argument for this ? I mean, the
> materialist / idealist debate has been going on in philosophy since the
> pre-Socratics, so what makes W. think that we should accept his take on the
> matter just on his say-so ? It is not given as an axiom, as in Spinoza for
> example, instead it is pronounced by fiat.
>
> O.K.
>
>
>
>
> --
> palma,  e TheKwini, KZN
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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>
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>  palma
>
> cell phone is 0762362391
>
>
>
>  *only when in Europe*:
> inst. J. Nicod
> 29 rue d'Ulm
> f-75005 paris france
>
>
>
>


-- 
palma,  e TheKwini, KZN












 palma

cell phone is 0762362391




 *only when in Europe*:

inst. J. Nicod

29 rue d'Ulm

f-75005 paris france

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