[lit-ideas] Re: Some Wittgenstein passages
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 14:48:49 +0100
>For W. the opposite is the case "the tree is growing" is a fact
ontologically prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree.>
This sounds to me like just the kind of cobblers that both the early and later
Wittgenstein were dead against. In case I am mistaken about this, and this is
in fact what is claimed as "the case" "For W.", please could someone explain
how _from Wittengenstein's writings_ we arrive at the claim '"the tree is
growing" is a fact
ontologically prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree."
If this claim is in W's writings I appear to have missed it.
DnlLdn
On Thursday, 19 June 2014, 7:56, palma <palmaadriano@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
the point can be read, easily, as being non trivial.
For, consider that the realm of the expressible is the realm of the real, give
or take some fluff about the unsayable etc.
what is expressible is propositionally structured, hence it is a thought (see
G. Frege Gedankefuge, in LU.)
It follows that things, independently from how ro who refers to "things", are
not the what the totality of the world is.
Whether this is true or false, lemme know. By my counts most people think there
are things (they have in mind pens, trees, cars, houses, sometime even stars
and atoms) and believe that "facts" are mental constructs of some sort.
For W. the opposite is the case "the tree is growing" is a fact ontologically
prior to the alleged "thing" called growth or tree.
On Thu, Jun 19, 2014 at 12:19 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I will try to post in the coming days some W. passages with questions /
comments. I apologize that the comments will likely be brief, as I am in a
rather gloomy mood these days. The passages will probably be from the Tractatus
and the PI. (I haven't got access to the Blue Book.)
>
>
>Tractatus 1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
>
>
>First, it is not entirely clear what is meant by the facts/things opposition,
>but I suppose that what is meant is mental facts, as opposed to material
>things. If so, where is the argument for this ? I mean, the materialist /
>idealist debate has been going on in philosophy since the pre-Socratics, so
>what makes W. think that we should accept his take on the matter just on his
>say-so ? It is not given as an axiom, as in Spinoza for example, instead it is
>pronounced by fiat.
>
>
>O.K.
--
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