[lit-ideas] Re: Smullyaniana
- From: "Donal McEvoy" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "donalmcevoyuk" for DMARC)
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 10:45:26 +0000 (UTC)
The Smullyan quotes do not amount to any significant criticism of Popper's
ideas. But let's start with Wittgenstein and "Death is not an event in life".
We have debated this before - clearly enough the process of dying may be an
event experienced in life, and if we mean by this "Death" then W is wrong.
The state of being dead arises after life ends and so if this is what we mean
by "Death" then W may be right, and even perhaps 'analytically' so.
But the TLP does not seek to show/say the truth of every analytic proposition,
and it is doubtful that W thinks his senseless propositions are analytic in the
usual sense. So why 'say' "Death is not an event in life"? My suggestion is
that this shows something true, for W, and importantly true: and it is a truth
of a piece with the truth that the border and what lies beyond the visual field
are not part of the visual field, and that the border and what lies beyond
'what can be said with sense' cannot themselves be said with sense (though,
according to the TLP, the border may be shown; as may its basis in the logical
isomorphism of language and reality). It is not manifest to everyone what
attitude to death is conveyed or shown by "Death is not an event in life" - and
this will obviously strike some as deep wisdom and others as vacuous and
unhelpful. Perhaps it does not show any sayable attitude to death at all, but
must be viewed in terms of the rest of the TLP as pointing towards yet another
truth that cannot be expressed in language with strict [factual] sense.
As a sidebar: in English law there is a distinction between 'being dead' and
'not being alive', but this is less absurd than it seems as it applies not to
the state of death/not living but to types of resultant losses. It means that
there is a distinction between losses arising from not being alive (like lost
earnings) and losses arising from being dead (like funeral costs). The courts
aren't saying someone not alive may not be dead or vice versa.
Re Popper:
ii. Of course the falsity of the fact that you believe that the pillar box is
blue IMPLIES that you don't believe it is blue; but this does not mean that
you believe it is NOT blue!>
Okay, take X where X is "It is false that 'Smith believes the pillar box is
blue'". X is consistent with 'Smith believes the pillar box is not blue' and
also with 'Smith believes there is no pillar box, blue or not'. Now, if 'Smith
believes the pillar box is not blue' then obviously Smith believes it is not
blue: a question may be raised as to whether Smith can believe is it false that
'The pillar box is blue', in the sense where Smith also believes there is a
pillar box, and yet not believe the pillar box is not blue? Logically he
perhaps should believe it, but perhaps Smith's beliefs defy logic?
What Popper says is that he does not 'believe in belief' or in 'epistemic
logic' or in the JTB version of knowledge, and this kind of problem is really
far removed from what is central to Popper's ideas and view of knowledge. [You
may find such problems clogging up philosophy journals but not scientific ones
or even ones in a non-scientific field like law].
Of course, Smith can believe there is no pillar box, and do so without
believing the pillar box is not blue (after all, it doesn't exist): this also
has sweet fanny adams to do with what is central to Popper's ideas and view of
knowledge.
So (1) you will not find a very direct reply to the kind of point made by
Smullyan within Popper's work (2) Smullyan's point is a sideshow to what is
important given Popper's work (3) the sideshow is likely a product of adherence
to some form of JTB-'theory of knowledge'.
iii. Some people are always critical of vague statements. I tend rather to be
critical of precise statements; they are the only ones which can be correctly
labelled 'wrong.'>
Whether vague or precise, every statement has its negation - and either the
statement is true and the negation false or the statement is false and the
negation true. It may be that it is harder to decide the truth or falsity of
vague statements - but perhaps not always: but the negation of a vague
statement will itself generally be a vague statement ['Not all blondes are
dumb']. And, provided the vagueness is not such as to mean the statement lacks
'sense', either the vague statement or its vague negation will be true (but not
both).
What we should not confuse is truth and falsity with proof and disproof - yet
these are frequently confused. It is right to say that statements that lack a
clear falsifiable character may be statements where it is hard to disprove them
because of this lack: but they will nevertheless be either true or false, just
as with more falsifiable statements.
Smullyan may be read as making a point very congenial to Popper's outlook - for
Popper explains that human W3-based knowledge grows through critical feedback,
and therefore falsifiable formulations are preferable to non-falsifiable
because they better lend themselves to critical feedback. In a like manner we
prefer 'the precise' formulation to 'the vague' because it lends itself better
to criticism (though Popper also argues we sometimes use a most imprecise and
mistaken view of 'precision').
DNormal service resumedTemporarily
Replace 'wrong' (in iii) and 'falsity' (in ii) with some Popperian version of
falsifiability and you see how un-Popperian Smullyan can be!
From: "dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Sunday, 12 February 2017, 21:04
Subject: [lit-ideas] Smullyaniana
An old Reedian, as they call them (cfr. "old Wykehamist," or "old Cliftonian,"
as Grice was), R. M. Smullyan (a friend of Grice's, incidentally) takes
positions which may be called anti-McEvoyian, in that they (the positions, that
is) were anti-Witters, and anti-Popper.
Against Witters, Smullyan (whose favourite book, for Grice, was his
"First-order logic" -- that he relied on for his "Vacuous Names") expressed:
i. Why should I worry about death? It's not going to happen in my lifetime!
This is in obvious opposition to the much more obscure thoughts on death and
dying by Witters in the, of all treatises -- or 'tractatuses', as Geary does
not prefer -- "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus".
The utterances against Popper is more convoluted; there are at least two:
ii. Of course the falsity of the fact that you believe that the pillar box is
blue IMPLIES that you don't believe it is blue; but this does not mean that you
believe it is NOT blue!
iii. Some people are always critical of vague statements. I tend rather to be
critical of precise statements; they are the only ones which can be correctly
labelled 'wrong.'
Replace 'wrong' (in iii) and 'falsity' (in ii) with some Popperian version of
falsifiability and you see how un-Popperian Smullyan can be!
Cheers,
Speranza
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