[lit-ideas] Re: Sick dogs and virtue epist.

  • From: "Phil Enns" <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 11 Jun 2004 16:33:20 -0400

Walter Okshevsky wrote:

"[Can we] hold people morally responsible for their unjustified beliefs.
... And if so, under what circumstances? For the past few months now,
I've been haunted with the matter of whether epistemic virtues and moral
virtues have some common root."

Wouldn't the common root be the Good?  Don't we expect people to do the
best they can with regards to holding justified beliefs because this
being truthful and acting rightly are goods proper to human beings?
Someone who holds beliefs without consideration of whether they are
justified or not is not merely right or wrong but untrustworthy.
Someone who refuses to reconsider their beliefs in light of
contradictory evidence is not merely wrong but of suspect character.
People have a moral responsibility to care whether their beliefs are
justified and act accordingly.  Therefore both epistemic and moral
virtues have their ends in human beings being truthful and acting

I am sure Walter has already considered this so I merely throw out the
above in order to provoke Walter to share what he has come up with.


Phil Enns
Toronto, ON

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