Hanson, op. cit., pp 144-7. "Might not so many thousands of men devour the very Georgia countryside that they traversed? Might not his men end up, as fanatical Georgians promised, not 300 miles away in Savannah, but perhaps 150 to the east of Atlanta in Midwinter in the middle of nowhere - lost and stuck in transit in the red Georgia mud, starving, and picked off by guerrillas -as Grant warned and Jefferson Davis promised - as local militias blocked roads, burned bridges, and destroyed the food supply? What if the Army of the West had to fight for a week or so straight? How could a mere two hundred rounds of cartridges per man suffice, scarcely what an army might fire in a single day of heavy fighting? Were animals that had been collected and stalled in Atlanta fit enough to pull wagons three hundred miles through Georgia? Without communications, how was Sherman to know whether Hood, Longstreet, or even Lee was marching to blindside him near the coast? If Grant and Thomas were defeated while he was incommunicado, how was he to explain that his men were not fighting Rebs but burning plantations? Could the North spare an army of 60,000 out of the theater of battle operations? And if so, for how long? "To the iconoclast B. H. Liddell Hart, Sherman's preference for the indirect approach in ending the war was 'a supreme act of moral courage.' 'To have the enemy in his rear, to divide his army, to cut himself adrift from railroad and telegraph, from supplies and reinforcements, and launch not a mere raiding force of cavalry but a great army into the heart of a hostile country - pinning his faith and his fortune on a principle which he had deduced by reasoning contrary to orthodoxy. And with nothing to fortify his spirit beyond that reasoning, for his venture was to be made under the cloud of dubious permission of his military superior, the anxious fears of his President, and the positive objections of their advisers.' "The chorus of doubters was indeed unanimous in their disdain. Neutral observers in Europe wrote, 'He has done either one of the most brilliant or one of the most foolish things ever performed by a military leader.' General Halleck wavered and General Rawlins, Grant's chief of staff, went to Lincoln to stop him: Sherman, who had suffered one breakdown, was now about to sacrifice his entire army. Even Grant for a time believed that Sherman 'would be bushwacked by all the old men, little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home.' Lincoln himself later would confess to Sherman, 'When you were about leaving Atlanta for the Atlantic coast, I was anxious, if not fearful; but feeling that you were the better judge, and remembering "nothing risked, nothing gained," I did not interfere.' On Sherman's departure Lincoln had earlier remarked to anxious inquirers, 'I know what hole he went in, but I don't know which one he will come out.' Later in the afterglow of Sherman's fame the envious would claim that Grant, Halleck, Thomas, or others had planned the March to the Sea, but in November 1864, no other than Sherman wanted anything to do with the idea of a march through Georgia. 'In thus fixing his purpose,' wrote Jacob Cox, one of Sherman's generals, 'Sherman had no assistance.' "Southerners feigned delight with the madman's apparent recklessness. One minister proclaimed that 'God has put a hook in Sherman's nose and is leading him to destruction.' The old war veteran Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederacy, pompously dismissed the idea of a march through his country in pseudo-historical terms: 'Sherman can not keep up his long line of communications, and must retreat. Soon or later he must, and when that day comes the fate that befell the army of the French Empire in its retreat from Moscow will be re-enacted. Our cavalry and our people will harass and destroy his army. As did the Cossacks that of Napoleon, and the Yankee General, like him will escape with only a bodyguard.' "Sherman in contrast had not a doubt - neither did the majority of his men. As he left Atlanta in flames on November 16, Sherman in fact rejoiced at the thought of leading 62,000 men wherever he wished: 'The day was extremely beautiful, clear sunlight, with bracing air, and an unusual feeling of exhilaration seemed to pervade all minds - a feeling of something to come, vague and undefined, still full of venture and intense interest. Even the common soldiers caught the inspiration, and many a group called out to me as I worked my way past them, "Uncle Billy, I guess Grant is waiting for us at Richmond"' "Sherman continued: 'Indeed the general sentiment was that we were marching for Richmond, and that there we should end the war, but how and when they seemed to care not; nor did they measure the distance, or count the cost of life, or bother their brains about the great rivers to be crossed, and the food required for man and beast, that had to be gathered by the way. There was a "devil-may-care" feeling pervading officers and men, that made me feel the full load of my responsibility, for success would be accepted as a matter of course, whereas, should we fail, this 'march' would be adjudged the wild adventure of a crazy fool.' "To his superior, General Halleck, this crazy fool was more sober. 'I can take so eccentric a course that no general can guess my objective. Then when you hear I am off have look-outs at Morris Island, S.C., Ossabaw sound, GA., Pensacola and Mobile Bay. I will turn up some where.' "And so he did, and when he came out the hole he had entered, the fate of the Confederacy was at last sealed. The Iowa sergeant, Alexander Downing, summed up the army's spirit best as they left Atlanta: 'Started early this morning for the Southern coast, somewhere, and we don't care, so long as Sherman is leading us.'" Comment: The idea of starting out as Sherman did sounds really spooky to me and dangerous. I have a terribly poor sense of direction, hate to travel, and haven't done much of it, but Sherman wasn't like me. He had a superb sense of direction and he loved travel. In earlier years he traveled extensively in the South. He didn't forget the places he had been. He knew the South intimately. He knew where he was going, and he was confident he could deceive any of the Southern armies about his location at any given time. When Eric said Liddell Hart was over-rated, I looked for him in Hanson's bibliography and in his index. He isn't there, and yet Hanson does quote him here, calling him an iconoclast in the process. Years ago I read Heinz Guderian's Panzer Leader. Guderian said in the volume I read that he learned from Hart. I later learned that Hart impacted the English version to show Guderian favoring Hart over J. F. C. Fuller. In the German Guderian makes no distinction between them. He appreciated both of them equally. Then too, the one biography about Hart hasn't done his reputation any good, http://www.amazon.com/Alchemist-War-Life-Basil-Hart/dp/0753808730/ref=sr_1_3 ?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1214096559&sr=1-3 An Amazon reviewer says, "Finally about BLH. He was a military historian and strategist that rose from the ashes of the Great War. He was an innovator (guilty of a bit of measurable theft). He wrote biographies of military leaders that had an ulterior purpose that lent to a biased rendering of the biography (see my review of Scipio Africanus). He had the ear of the highest levels of the British Military and a few devotees among the Nazi generals. He was a warrior that came to despise war. Later biographers implied that he was unwilling to recognize the 'naked reality of evil" after he published flattering accounts of his meetings with Nazi generals. In that way he reminds me of current public figures that would treat organized terrorism as a law enforcement problem to be resolved judicially.'" So Eric's friend may be right, but I am not concerned with Hart's reputation as a whole, only with what he has to say about Sherman. Other than calling him an iconoclast, Hanson treats him with respect, so I shall as well - unless I hear more damaging information from Eric. Lawrence Helm San Jacinto