[lit-ideas] Re: Shall we consider another philosopher?

  • From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2014 17:30:52 -0800 (PST)

 There was a misunderstanding, I think that we have now reached a more or less 
correct interpretation of A. in that passage (I don't know Greek either, other 
than some expressions like eudomenia etc.) and I was now moving to express a 
certain criticism of A.'s proposals in that passage. For one thing, a 
rhetorician, just like anyone else, often makes factual claims that can be 
verified or falsified. I can hardly make an ethical or political argument that 
we should we take John's car away without somehow implying that John has a car 
in the first place, and that latter claim can be empirically verified or 
falsified. Also, while we can possibly agree that rhetorical arguments do not 
demand demonstration, I would at least expect that the conclusion follows from 
the premises, provided that these are true. Demonstration in A. means both that 
the premises are certainly true and that the conclusion follows necessarily 
from the premises, and he does not expect
 to hold ethical or political arguments to such a high standard, but I am not 
sure that I agree that the standards of proof should be lowered when someone is 
arguing for a protracted war, for example, or for social policies that might 
affect even future generations, while they should be kept higher when talking 
about the 'forms' whose existence or non/existence hardly affects anyone in any 
visible way. That was about the gist of what I was saying.

O.K



On Monday, January 27, 2014 12:59 AM, John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx> 
wrote:
 
Omar,

Isn't this one of those cases in which context is very important? As I read the 
following statement,

"In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for 
it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things 
just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is [clearly/surely/plainly] 
equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand 
from a rhetorician scientific proofs" [Nicomachean Ethics, I.1]

Aristotle has set up a contrast between probable reasoning and mathematical 
proof. The former Is what we expect from a rhetorician, the latter what we 
expect from a mathematician. It makes no sense to accept only probable 
reasoning from a mathematician from whom we expect mathematical proofs. It 
equally makes no sense to demand mathematical proofs for a rhetorician who can, 
at best, offer only probable reasoning. We are still perfectly free to examine 
the evidence that the rhetorician deploys and how well he deploys it, to judge 
how probable the argument seems. To me, that means anywhere on a scale from 
nonsense to beyond a reasonable doubt.

I expect that in this case you will make that judgment based on consideration 
of the evidence in the quote presented above. You might still reject my 
argument. I, for example, know no Greek and must, therefore depend on the 
translation from which the quote is taken. I can imagine a rebuttal based, for 
example, on the claim that the Greek term translated "proof" has some meaning 
significant differential from what is now meant by "proof" in books on 
mathematical logic. That would open up a new and, to me at least, interesting 
line of inquiry. But the relevant arguments would all be based on probable 
reasoning and, thus, given Aristotle's distinction, as I understand it, in the 
realm of the rhetorician and not that of the mathematician.

Does this makes sense to you.

John

Sent from my iPad

On 2014/01/27, at 3:49, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:


In the same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for 
it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things 
just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is [clearly/surely/plainly] 
equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand 
from a rhetorician scientific proofs.[Nicomachean Ethics, I.1]

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