[lit-ideas] Re: Shall we consider another philosopher?
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2014 10:49:15 -0800 (PST)
Is it always foolish to demand proofs from a rhetorician ? I am not all that
convinced that it is. After all, it is possible to produce a rhetorically
persuasive argument to defend almost any position, as the sophists have taught
us. (Particularly when the audience is willing to be persuaded) On the other
hand, accepting a rhetorically persuasive argument without holding it to some
standard of evidence or proof can have grave consequences. I am thinking, for
example, of the run to Iraq war, when it was accepted as probable that Saddam's
regime had some WMDs on the basis of rhetorical arguments even though no hard
evidence was provided in support of this claim, and it was later falsified, or
something very close to that.
O.K.
On Sunday, January 26, 2014 7:20 AM, John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
What Robert and Omar said. Let us agree that we understand what Aristotle meant
and that he was talking about ethical/political debate, where demanding
scientific proofs from a rhetorician is as foolish as accepting only probably
proof from a mathematician. What, then, of Whitehead's stronger claim, that the
kind of necessity proper to mathematical demonstrations cannot be transferred
to philosophy? And if mathematical demonstration cannot be expected of
philosophy, what alternatives do we have for judging the quality of a
philosopher's work?
John
On Sun, Jan 26, 2014 at 6:14 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
I have actually checked it now, Aristotle speaks in that passage about ethics -
well, the subject of the treatise at hand - which he characterizes as 'a kind
of political science.' Hence, it is hopefully not incompatible with my
suggestion that he means political arguments which, as suggested in the
Rhetoric, he does not hold to possess demonstrative certainty. But presumably
ethical arguments would be held to be similar to political. Also, hopefully it
should not be taken that I necessarily hold the same opinion with Aristotle, he
was cited as an authority so I tried to see what he might he might have meant.
>
>
>O.K.
>
>
>
>On Saturday, January 25, 2014 9:55 PM, Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>While discussing a passage from Whitehead John McCreery wrote
>
>
>I am particularly struck by that line, The kind of necessity proper to
>mathematical demonstrations cannot be transferred to philosophy, which
>instantly reminds me of that favourite passage of mine in the
Nichomachean Ethics, the knowledge of which I
>owe to Robert Paul, in
which the Sage observes that not all arguments are equally susceptible
to mathematical rigour and that it is the mark of an education person to
know which is which.
>
>*Omar is troubled by this. He writes
>
>I am pretty sure that Aristotle would not have agreed with the
above. He would have thought that many philosophical arguments are
capable of demonstration that carries just as much necessity as
mathematical demonstration. When he speaks of arguments which are not
capable of demonstration he is most likely thinking of political and
legal arguments, which he transfers to the subordinate realm of
rhetoric.
>
>Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the
>subject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all
>discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts. Now fine and
>just actions, which political science investigates, admit of much variety and
>fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be thought to exist only by
>convention, and not by nature. And goods also give rise to a similar
>fluctuation because they bring harm to many people; for before now men have
>been undone by reason of their wealth, and others by reason of their courage.
>We must be content, then, in speaking of such subjects and with such premisses
>to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things
>which are only for the most part true and with premisses of the same kind to
>reach conclusions that are no better. In the same spirit, therefore, should
>each type of statement be received; for it is the mark of
an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as
the nature of the subject admits; it is [clearly/surely/plainly] equally
foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a
rhetorician scientific proofs.[Nicomachean Ethics, I.1]
<http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.1.i.html>
>
>
>*Here, Aristotle doesn't appear to talk so much about philosophical arguments,
>as about our discussions of different subject matter: they shouldn't all be
>considered in the same way. (I'm not sure just what a philosophical argument
>is, unless it's the sort of thing people engaged in at Plato's Academy, and
>now engage in in the pages of Mind, The Philosophical Review, and elsewhere.)
>The most important line in this passage from the NE is the last. I'm glad John
>remembers it.
>
>
>RP
>
>
>
--
John McCreery
The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
Tel. +81-45-314-9324
jlm@xxxxxxxxxxxx
http://www.wordworks.jp/
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