On 12/29/06, Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: Nonsense. That there is debate over definitions does not mean that there is
isn't clarity over what an expression can't mean.
Phil is right. But he he omits is that qualification that the clarity in question is limited to players of a particular language game, who have agreed that to play their game an expression must be used in a particular way. Thus, for example, students in an introduction to philosophy class may be told that the history of philosophy can be divided into Ancient, Medieval, and Modern periods. As this (hypothetical) course unfolds they are told that Plato is Ancient, Aquinas Medieval and Descartes the first of the Moderns. If, then, on the final exam they identify Descartes as an ancient philosopher, their teacher can say, unequivocally, "You're wrong." Phil has said a number of things about the "modern" in "modern philosophers." He has claimed that it is a term of art known and used by philosophers to designate Descartes and later philosophers. If, then, Langer is both writing as a philosopher and using a term of art as such, she is being a sloppy philosopher. My reply on this point is that, if you read the surrounding text, it is clear that Langer is not using "modern philosophers" in the same sense as Phil's term of art. He may reply that if she uses "modern philosophers" in some different sense, she is not a member of the group he recognizes as properly trained philosophers and, thus, he is free to hold her in contempt. To me this is mere tribalism with elitist pretensions. Phil has also claimed that "modern" makes a general distinction on a par with that made by "serious" and described an everyday meaning of "serious" that implies that being a serious philosopher is something like being a serious beer drinker or serious cricket player—a description under which Langer is surely a serious philosopher. This description cannot, therefore, be whatever it was that Walter had in mind when he implied that Langer is not a serious philosopher. Which brings me to This 'debate by
definition' is a rhetorical move that distracts from whatever substantial issues are at hand.
Indeed. This is why I take Phil's haring off after the notion that "modern philosopher" and "serious philosopher" make similar general distinctions to be a red herring. I am still waiting for Walter to tell us what he did, in fact, have in mind. My imagination suggests someone like Walter's beloved Kant, a sober, methodical purveyor of subtle distinctions who claims to have discovered some absolute truths. In contrast, Langer, while also a purveyor of subtle distinctions, makes no such claim. In the introduction to _Form and Feeling_ she writes, "A book, like a human being, cannot do everything; it cannot answer in a few hundred pages all the questions which the Elephant's Chile in his 'satiable curiosity might choose to ask. So I may as well state at the outset what it does not attempt to do. It does not offer criteria for judging 'masterpieces,' nor even successful as against unsuccessful lesser works....It does not set up canons of taste. It does not predict what is possible or impossible in the confines of any art, what materials may be used in it, what subjects will be found congenial to it, etc. It will not help anyone to an artistic conception, nor teach him how to carry one our in any medium. All such norms and rulings seem to me to lie outside of the philosopher's province. The business of philosophy is to unravel and organize concepts, to give definite and satisfactory meanings to the terms we use in talking about any subject (in this case art); it is, as Charles Pierce said, 'to make our ideas clear'." Later she notes, "There are certain difficulties peculiar to this undertaking, some of which are of a practical, some of a semantical nature. In the first place, philosophy of art should, I believe, begin in the studio, not the gallery, auditorium, or library. Just as the philosophy of science required for its proper development the standpoint of the scientist, not of men....who saw "science" as a whole, but without any conception of its real problems and working concepts, so the philosophy of art requires the standpoint of the artist to test the power of its concepts and prevent empty or naive generalizations." It follows, then, that the philosopher must listen to artists, who are not altogether articulate in talking about what they do. "They speak their own language, which largely resists translation into the more careful, literal vocabulary of philosophy....Their vocabulary is metaphorical because it has to be plastic and powerful to let them speak their serious and often difficult thoughts. They cannot see art as 'merely' this-or-that easily comprehensible phenomenon; they are too interested in it to make concessions to language. The critic who despises their poetic speech is all too likely to be superficial in his examination of it, and to impute to them ideas they do not hold rather than to discover what they really think and know." In an effort to reconstruct what artists think and know in "the more careful, literal vocabulary of philosophy," the philosopher will often find herself using terms in new senses. Thus, "All the poor philosopher can do is to define his words and trust the reader to bear their definition in mind. Often, however, the reader is not ready to accept a definition—especially it it is in any way unusual—until he sees what the author intends by it, why the word should be so defined...." She requests from her reader, in other words, the openness of mind required to reserve judgment and consider the possibility that expressions may be used in ways different from those that the reader expects. Does that make her non-serious? Not to me. John -- John McCreery The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN http://www.wordworks.jp/