[lit-ideas] Schrödinger's Cat Sat On Eddington's Table
- From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2015 18:46:32 -0500
In a message dated 1/30/2015 12:26:00 P.M. Eastern Standard Time, donalmce
voyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes in "The location of location"
>>Locating W1 objects within W1 is far more problematic that it might seem.
The problem I had in mind was not finding keys when you need them...
I was thinking:
Schrödinger's cat sat on Eddington's Table -- for an hour.
(a variant on Toulmin, "The cat sat on the mat", which I think he derived
from an English reading textbook for primary school).
I will re-read McEvoy's continuation below in ps, and re-consider.
But I thought finding keys was a good analogue, and a quantum-physical
expansion of Toulmin's easy sentence might be, too.
Cheers,
Speranza
"... but, for example, the problem of explaining how/why W1 objects (that
are extended in Descartes' sense) are located within space/time (that is
unextended in Descartes' sense)? How can an extended object be located within
a field that lacks extension (bearing in mind it is simply a
hypostasization to treat space and time as if they are 'extended' by referring
to them in
measurable terms so that it appears they have varieties of size; and even
if it is true that they may be measured in size, that does not make them
extended in Descartes' sense)? [Compare: how can an 'unextended' force like
gravity affect an extended physical object, even one the size of a sun?] We
might suggest the problem of explaining how extended W1 'objects' can exist
in unextended space/time is at least as problematic as the problem of
explaining how W2 or W3 'objects' stand in relation to space/time. These kinds
of question cannot properly be left only to philosophers, particularly
philosophers without sound understanding of science - they need to be
approached taking into close account what we may conjecture about these things
in
the light of our best contemporary theories in physics. Popper would stress
that we lack anything like an ultimate explanation for these things - for
example, we lack anything like an ultimate explanation for how or why W1
objects are located within space/time. It may be that contemporary physics
will
be overthrown before we have a better approach to such questions - e.g.
that the relations between space/time and W1 objects will be theorised to be
quite different to how they might be taken to be in the light of our
present physics (itself a difficult and controversial question). Popper would
also argue that ultimate explanations shall never be achieved in this area -
though we may make better or worse guesses in the light of our evolving
scientific knowledge. This may help indicate why facing the difficulties of
locating W1 objects within W1 is therefore a fair starting-point before facing
the admitted difficulties of locating W2 and W3 content in relation to
space/time and in relation to W1.
Certainly taking this as a starting-point may dampen the impulse to doubt
the existence of autonomous W2 and W3 content (and its downward affects on
W1) because of these 'location' difficulties - given that we do not
similarly and impulsively conclude that W1 objects and space/time do not exist
simply because there are difficulties in explaining how they relate to one
another."
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