[lit-ideas] Re: Schopenhauer Reads Grice
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 18 Mar 2014 16:29:03 -0700 (PDT)
Time to send JL to bed.
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 12:11 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
Schopenhauer knew German, English, and French, as well as Greek and Latin.
On Wednesday, March 19, 2014 12:02 AM, "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx"
<Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> wrote:
Does Davidson quote from Schopenhauer?
He should!
We are considering various things, such as the basis for common or mutual
trust in dialogue and an obscure tract by Schopenhauer on the principle of
sufficient reason
("obscure" according to Aquinas, not me) -- and its
fourfold root.
My last post today.
In a message dated 3/18/2014 6:48:59 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes:
"Eh, JL has forgotten to explain how "Do not say what you believe to be
false, or lack adequate evidence for" is not a prescriptive command instead
of a descriptive principle. I can say whatever I want, it seems to me. Who
will prevent me, and how?"
and previously:
"The distinction between reason and cause was certainly not something
invented by Davidson. Schopenhauer in his essay The Fourfold Root of the
Principle of Sufficient Reason certainly makes a distinction between ' a reason
as the ground of a conclusion', and 'a cause of the occurrence of a real
event.' Both are
thought to be forms of the more general Principle of
Sufficient Reason (of which there are four,) but they are to be kept firmly
separate
in their distinct realms of application, the first being the realm of
abstract reasoning (especially of logic) and the second being the realm of the
empirical world. The other two forms of the Principle have their respective
applications in mathematics and in psychology (motive as the reason or
ground of acting). I am not sure whether playing with the slightly different
senses of 'should' can illuminate this much further."
Suppose I am reading Grice.
Or worse, suppose I am reading Schopenhauer.
Then I PRESUPPOSE that whatever Schopenhauer writes is TRUE -- especially
if he says it four times (cfr. Lewis Carroll, "What I say three times is
true").
"The distinction between reason and cause was
certainly not something
invented by Davidson. Schopenhauer in his essay The Fourfold Root of the
Principle of Sufficient Reason certainly makes a distinction between ' a reason
as the ground of a conclusion', and 'a cause of the occurrence of a real
event.'".
I should expand this as:
Schopenhauer thinks that there is a distinction to be made between a reason
as the ground of a conclusion (all properly expressed in the Teutonic
language that was his mother tongue) and a cause of the occurrence of a real
event.
For surely Schopenhauer did believe WHAT he wrote. And I should trust, qua
reader, Schopenhauer. I grant that there is a step between the above and MY
actually believing the distinction EXISTS but it's too fine (or nice) to
be made.
O. K. goes on to revise Schopenhauer
"Both [reason and cause] are thought to be forms of the
more general
Principle of Sufficient Reason (of which there are four,) but they are to be
kept firmly separate in their distinct realms of application, the first being
the realm of abstract reasoning (especially of logic) and the second being
the realm of the empirical world."
I take it that if Schopenahuer wrote this, he BELIEVED it. It's different
with poets (notably Whitman, "Yes. I contradict, and so? I contain
multitudes!").
Omar goes on to revise Schopenhauer:
"The other two forms of the Principle have their respective applications in
mathematics and in psychology (motive as the reason or ground of acting).
I am not sure whether playing with the slightly different senses of
'should' can illuminate this much further."
Plus, when I would think we only have ONE sense: 'should' is MONOSEMOUS, as
I like to say.
But back to
Grice's QUALITY,
"do not say what you believe to be false, or lack adequate evidence for".
There must be earlier versions for this, that Grice calls a 'desideratum'.
Grice does grant that it may be seen as 'descriptive' ("honesty is the best
policy"). We are induced to it, by our parents or educators -- and it
would be a bit of complication to provide an alteranative and come up with a
'lie' every other time.
But while Grice allows that we DO, as a matter of fact, abide by some
desideratum of trustworthiness, we also SHOULD.
In what sense of 'should'?
In the only sense of 'should', since 'should' is monosemous.
Perhaps not in German. Note that German 'sollen' translates as 'shall',
rather than 'should'.
But O. K. is right that this is controversial, especially in the context of
Schopenhauer who spent his life criticising Kant -- whom
Grice is echoing!
Cheers,
Speranza
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