[lit-ideas] Re: Same and similar in philosophical argument and the 'cross-bearing' argument
- From: "Donal McEvoy" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "donalmcevoyuk" for DMARC)
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 27 Jan 2018 14:23:42 +0000 (UTC)
the so called cross bearing is a faint antisymmetrical function of Molineux
problem.as for the idea that independent modalities give relative more weight
to the non mental nature of x, they may be found in Sextus empiricus, but in
more recent times in the theory of general knowledge by J. Fichte, see in
particular his treatment of Anstoss.>
This gives us some names and some assertions as to their arguments, but not
enough information to clearly assess whether their arguments are the same as
Churchill's.
There are many similarities between (nevertheless) distinct arguments in
philosophy; as Popper's point is that there is something original (and
therefore distinct) in Churchill's argument, it may not suffice as refutation
to indicate something similar in some other writer. For example, I accept that
Fichte's "Anstoss" (or check) provides some similarity to the cross-check (or
cross-bearing) that is part of Churchill's argument; otoh, Fichte (1) was an
idealist (2) Fichte's Anstoss is an _internal_ and not an external check - and
these two points alone indicate the "Anstoss" hardly has anything like the same
role, or argumentative function, as the external check by way of sunspots that
Churchill uses as an argument for realism about the existence of the sun (as
existing outside our experience of it).
So something more is needed to spell out that the similarities are such that
the argument is the same: and this may also involve further amplification of
Churchill's argument. For example, it might be a mistake to think Churchill is
just saying that we can prove a sun external to our experience by our
experience of a spot crossing the sun (as a counter-argument would be that the
experience of the spot need not be any more "external" than the experience of
the sun, and so this argument would fail to show there is anything external to
our experience). I think Popper is interpreting Churchill as making a rather
more ingenious and compelling argument, and one that asserts that the
cross-check could in principle be made without any (significant) reliance on
any internal sense experience.
DL
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