I don't think I am being misleading if you read what immediately precedes the paragraph you quote from, namely "He [Hare] argues that claims are moral if and only if they take the form of universalizable prescriptions. They are universalizable in that an agent must be willing to apply them to all cases that are alike in all the relevant respects. They are prescriptive in that they provide guidance about how to act and they are necessarily connected to motivation." The term "universalizable," I would think, implies a sort of Kantian Categorical Imperative, i.e., able to be made universal. Or are you saying the reviewer has Hare wrong? Lawrence -----Original Message----- From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Robert Paul Sent: Wednesday, June 07, 2006 6:52 PM To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: SOS - BA vs Hare's prescriptive Lawrence Helm wrote: [some interesting things which I'm skipping over for now] and > One can see that Taylor (at least at this point) is taking a very > different tack from Hare and yet I wonder if Hare doesn't have the truer > hold on this matter. Do we really think as Taylor argues that we settle > for the BA, Best Account? Or do we with Hare believe our framework is > the truth and that it should be universalized. This is fairly misleading. Hare isn't arguing that we first discover some moral 'truth' and then work to get it universalized (or universalised). He's arguing that something about the 'logic' of moral language requires that anything we put forward as a moral judgment must be universalizable: that if it's correct in such and such circumstances then it must be correct in any similar circumstances (no idiosyncratic judgments). Some have argued that this is trivially true with respect to any judgment. Robert Paul ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html